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:WTROD'UCtt'IOB 
The purpose of tb.i ·s s t u dy is to exa."tline t h e various 
merit r a ting plans ('in ef.feet or proposed) under state unem-
ployment compensation lawa; to consid~r the methods by which 
such ratings will be applied, and to diaeover, .if' possible, 
whether 1 t is reas.onab~e to expect that employment may be 
stabil i zed to any degree through the influence of graduated 
contribution rates. 
A merit rnting scheme may exist in connection with 
e i ther a pooled .fund or an employer reserve system. Whichever 
plan is in e!f'ect, the. object of the merit rating scheme is to 
permit employe·rs haVing relatively stable employment experi-
ence to contribute to the unemployment fund at a lower rate 
than those 'lho$e employment is irregular. 
The subject 1# at present a controversial one., and only 
one state, Wiscon sin, has had any actual experi:ence which 
mi~t serve as a guide. In other states now paying benei'its, 
studie:a are being made with a view to arri vlng at practical 
and equitabl·e methods o~ .administering the merit -rating pro-
visions of their respective unemployment compensation laws. 
Aa might be expected, moe.t of the li.terature available 
on merit ratings has been prepared by the staff of t h e Social 
Security Board. Other important contributors include members 
-2-
of' the \"lis cons in administration and representati vea of' orgarll.zed 
labor. 
-3-
Ch.apter I 
HISTORY OF UNEfJPL01n~NT INSURANCE 
~Jhile unemployment compens-ation insurance has been in 
effect only a short time in the United States , Europ.ean countries 
have had it, in one f'orm or another. t:or over a century. 
Insurane• i tae1f is o£ very ancient origin and a 
study of its his-tory r-eveals that wh-enever society becomes 
subject to. a ,hazard. beyond. its control, which .affects a large 
number of individuale, some method of upooling" the risk has 
developed. It is natural, then, that the V$ry oldest form 
shoul d be li.fe insurance. 
Other forms include marine insurance and .fire insuranc&. 
va t h the development of the automobile came the special type 
of' accident insurance related to it. In Ma.ssachusetta, all 
a u tomobile o\mera. are requir-ed to carry insurance a gainst 
lo.sse.a resulting from personal injury to others, in order that 
payment of damages may be assured. 
Workmen's compens.a:tion insurance on -a l!U'ge scale is 
also a fairly recent development and, in ~assachusetts as- well 
as in many other states,, employers are required b y law to 
cover the risk either by insurance or by carrying their own 
reserves. The amount of premium charged by the insurance com-
panies varies with the industry and with the experience of the 
ind1 vidual employer. (In t his respect the worlanen' s compensa-
-4-
tion plan resembles the merit-rating schemes existing or pro-
posed under state unemp1oyment compensation laws in the United 
States.) 
It a.ppears that the earliest attempts to compensate 
tndi vi duals .fer wage losses due to un(mlployment were made by 
trade.;..unions and mutual. bene1'1 t aocieties. 'l'he industrial 
revolution brought new hazards to th.e workman's li.fe·. The 
:first unemployment compensation 1nsura:ooe plan on record (1) 
wa~ established in Basel Town in SWitzerland in 1?89. In 
England, a steam engine workers' society is recorded as having 
d1 s ·tri buted unemployment bene!'1 ta as early as 1824 11 and a 
print~ra'. union in Brussels had adopted a similar system by 
1846. All ·these uni-on plans and the exper1$nce under them 
formed the baaia .for later developments i.n this field on a 
larger seale. 
However, these union schemes barely scratched the sur-
face of the problem of unemployment relief' because the larger 
portion of the working population was unskilled and unorganized. 
To reach these wo:rke.ra voluntary systems subsidized by local 
governments were established. Three cities in Switzerl.and 11 
Berne~ Basel arid Zur1ch 11 led the movement,. which also made 1 ts 
appearance in Germany and Italy~ . The main dlfficul ty w1 th these 
(1) See "Social Security 1n America, "' U.S. Social Security 
Board. p .. 4. 
-5 ... 
funds waa the fact that their membership cons_isted so largely 
of individuals viho were subject to irregular ·employraent. 
l:iost of them ere shortly ~;tbandoned. 
Another variation of the government subsidy was tried 
out in France and in Pelgiurn where municipalities established 
a plan for subsidizing the trade-union systems of' bene.fi ts. 
This plan still aurvi vas a .s a baa! a . for the "voluntary" ays-
tems. 
'I'he next ste.p 1.n the development of unemployment com-
pensation was the addition to the nrunlcipal aub.sidy· of' a fur-
ther subsidy by th6 province (in Belg11.llli) or the canton (in 
Switzerland). 
France wa s the :first country to place unemployment com-
pensation on a nation-wide basis, when it proviaed for a 
national subsidy to voluntary funds in 1905. 
All of these voluntary plans 1 eft large nu.tnbers of' no!l-
uni on workers unprotected. The first compulsory pla..'1 on 
record was established in s~itzerland , in the canton of st. 
Gall, in 189.4. This compulsory plan was abnndonecr a.fter t :o 
years because the more regularly employed were unwilling to 
contribute • 
Great Britain established the first compulsory system 
of' unemployment benefits in 1911. At f~rst, it applied to 
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only six industries and about 2,soo.ooo workers.. It has since 
been extended until it no. covers about 15,000,000 indi vid-
uals. 
Prior to 1955, all of the large E\ll"'pean countries and 
many of the srnalle r ones had established unemplo-yment compen-
sation insurance on a nation-wide ba.si s, under either a com-
pulsory plan or a . voluntary subsidized ·eyatem. 
Because of economic conditions, the drains on these un-
employment funds in recent years have been eo great that the 
national gover.nments have had to st&p in. The plans thus lost 
the1r insurance identity and became channels for the distri-
bution of relie:f'. Under such eond1 tiona there has been little 
opportuni ty to consider the possibility of utilizing the in-
surance systems as a means of stabilizing employnent . 
In the United States, the development of unemployment 
insurance has followed somewhat the same pattern as in the 
Europea.."l countries, the trade-unions being the pioneers . In 
a ddition , there were ma.'ly employer-.sponaored plans in effect, 
but the total number covered by any kind of insurance plan 
prior to 1935 was but a small fraction of the wor king popula-
tion. "The optimism of a growing co1m.try, the long predominance 
of agriculture, and the relative breadth of employment oppor-
tunity have been factors in the slow ·development of an attack 
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on unemployment in the United States." (1) 
As early as 1 93.,6, however, the first unemployment in-
surance bill to be considered in tbe. United States wns intro-
ducted in the Massaehusetts le gi slature. A second bill a p-
peared in the Wisconsin legi slature in 1921~ at Whioh time 
1 t l a cked only one vote of passing. Further attempts to pas.s 
state 1 aws providing .for unemp1oyment insurance were made dur-
ing the next ~n ye.ars in Masaachuaet.ta, New York, Connecticut 
and i:Unne so ta, but ·without success. ( 2) 
Public interest in unemployment as a social . problem 
. was greatly increased during t he depression, so that by 1932 
-
commissions had been appointed in ae.veral atatea to study the 
matter~ An interstate connn1s sion had also been organized at 
t he instance o'£ Franklin D. Roosevelt, then Governor . of New 
York, on 'Which six of the lead1ng industrial states in the 
east were represented. The Democratic party platform of tha.t 
year included a pledge to support unemployment insurance leg-
islation by states. 
In Massachusetts, a Special Commission on the Stabi-
lizati on of Employment was appointed by Governor Joseph B. 
Ely in 1931 to 11collect and publish f.or the benefit of em-
ployers and employees in Masso.chuse.tts inf'orma ti. on on methods 
(1) "Social Security in America," U.S.Social Security Board. p ~8. 
f2) "An Historieal Account of Unemployment Insurance in the 
Social Security Act" Edwin E .W1 tte - Law and Contemporary 
Problems. Duke University. Vol .. III, 'No .1, p.-157. 
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of regularization am s-tabilization of busine s s and employ-
such 
mentrt and to mak~related studies as might nbe helpful .1n pro-
moting steadier employment for· wage earners. in Massachusetts." 
The reports of that Commission are based upon an exhaustive 
study of' employment conditions i n Massachusetts a nd of the 
causes and e.f'f'ects o.f the depre s sion whieh began , in t he 
United States, in 1929 .. That Commission recommended, in 1932, 
t h e establishment o.f' unemployment reserve& and t he payment of 
benef'i ts to individuals. In a minor! ty report, one member of 
t h e Commission records his pre.ference i'or a nation-wide scheme 
for unemployment and .for "work security" rather than .. unem-
ployment reserves. tl 
The only state whi ch succeeded in paselng an unemploy-
ment comiSnsation law prior to · 1935 was ·wisconsin. That law 
wa s passed in February, 1932.. The main obstacle to passage 
o:f such legislation tn the many other atatea Which had con-
sidered it was the fact that the additional eosts thus levied 
on employers within the state would place them at a disadvan-
tage in competing with employers in oth er state s not having 
simila r laws. 
In t he meantime, interest in the subj.ect was also be-
ing manifested in Congress, but all of' the b1lle pr·esented 
prior to 1935 :failed of' passage. The most important of t hese 
was the ' iagner-Lewls bill., off ered early in 1.934. It con-
-9-
tained the same plan .for overcoming the d1.ff'1eul ty blocking 
state legi .slation as is now found in the Social Security Act; 
i.e., t he levying of a .federal excise tax on employers, sub-
ject to credits for contributions to state unemployment com-
pensation funds. lifotwithstanding the enthusiasm displayed on 
behalf of the bill, it was never reported. 
Uowever, in a special mes$&ge to the same Congress in 
June 1934, President Roose.vel t promised to present the follow-
ing January a progrtmt_ dealing with social aectU'ity, including 
unemployment insurance. He also erea.ted, later that month, 
the Committee on Economic Security, Whieh was directed to 
"study problems relating to the economic security of 1ndiv1-
duals11 and to rend$r ita report not later than December 1st 
of that year. 
During the intervening months thia Committee made studies 
of' the various problems relating to aconom1c security, includ-
ing that .of unemployment compensation insurance·. In accordance 
with tbe President's instruct-ions:,. the Committee rendered its 
report, 'Ythich was tran:nnitted to Congress on January 17., 1935. 
Ai'ter considerable debate and revision, the Social Security 
Act was passed by Congress on August 9, and was approved by 
the President August 14, 1.935., 
The provisions o£ the Social Securl ty Act which relate 
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to unemployment 1n.surance are :found in Titles III and IX o~ 
t hat Act. Under Title I I I the Social Security Board i8 au-
thorized to make grants to states :for administration expenses 
in conne.ct1on with their unemployment compenstltion laws, pro-
vided the laws of s:Uch states meet certain requirements laid 
down in the Act. 
Under Title I X a .federal excise tilx. is levied upon 
all employer·a of' eight or more 1ndiv1duala 1n other than cer-
tain excepted employments. Against. this tax, credit is al-
lowed for .aU contributions. made to the. unemployment insurance 
fund of any state whoae unempJ.oy:ment compensation law has the 
approval ·Of' the Social Security Board. 
Prior to January 1 ,. 1936, ten atate.a had passed unem-
ployment compensation laws embodying the provisions required 
f or f'ederal approval, and all of the :Statea now have approved 
laws which enable employers to apply aa a credit a gainst the 
tax levied under Title IX,. amounts paid as contributions to 
their respective une.mploymen.t insurance f'unds. 
While t h e Br1t11h law and t he expe.rienee thereunder 
served as a BUide in :framing t he p rovi s ions o .f the ''draft 
bill" which the Social Security Board subndtted to the vario~s 
.states, it should be realized that the American acheme differs 
f'rom the Br i tieh in many respects .• 
The most important di.ff'erence lie11 in the :fact that in 
-11-
Great Britain the government contributes to the .insurance 
.fund equally w1 th the employer and the employee . In the United 
States, the only jurisdiction in -which there is any gove~n­
mental contribution is the District of Columbia. Under the 
American plan, payments are financed by the employer alone, 
e x cept in 8iX states where employee eontt'ibutions are also re-
quired. 
Moreover; contributions under the British plan vary 
with the age and aex of the employee, while under the American 
plan the eontri but ion repres$nts a certain percentage of' the 
wages paid the emplo~e, regard1eaa ·o.f age or sax. 
Vli th respect to the paym:en.t of bene1'1 ta a1 so, there 
are wide differences between the two .ayatema. Und&r the Ameri-
can plan, subject to a defined minimum and maxinrum (usually 
$5 to $15), the weekly benetit is auppo.sed to represent ap ... 
proximately one·-half o:f the "norma.l"' weekly ftge.; under the 
Br1ti'tsh plan, the weekly benefit variea w1 th age and sex~ and 
is subject to increase f'or dependents. The District of Colum-
bia i .s t .he only jurisidlctlon in the United .Sta.tes which makes 
any allowance i'or dependents. It will thua. be aeen that while 
the American plan is .almost purely an "insurance" plan, the 
British plan is partly on a relie£ basis. 
The German plan also contains. a meane test and provi-
sion f'or additional ".family allowances" which make 1 t other 
-12,.. 
than a strict insurance. :aystem. 'l'hi.s is true also o.f the 
Belgian plan. In Swit~erland, an individual with dependents 
may Teoeive more than ·one Who has none. 
·So far, none o.f the state laws. (other than that ot: the 
District o:f Columbia) makes any refer-ence to .a "meansn test 
and it seems likely that . .so long as the •tate or .federal 
government makes no direct ·eontr1.but1on to the .fUnd, the .func ... 
tion of relief will be le.ft to oth·er agencies ... 
Thare is,. however, great need o.f a closer tie-up be-
tween re·11ef agencle.s and the unemployment compensation au-
thorities, 1n order that claimants who need relief during the 
waiting period may have it and in order that those who must 
may go "on re11e.f" promptly when their bene:f'1 t credits have 
been exhausted. 
--1.3-
Cbapter II 
TAXATION AS AN IUSTRUMENT OF SOCIAL COl TROL 
IN TRE .UNITED STATES 
Under the Constitu tion of' the United States, as inter-
preted by the courts:' the powe:r or the .federal g overnment to 
regulate business and industry has, until very recen tly, been 
lim1 ted to interstate C·ommerc$, under a narrowQ.r definition 
of' that term, and even 1n that field it waa once held that an 
attempt to regulate child labor by levying a prohibitive tax 
on interstate commerce in arti·clea manu!'actured in an industry 
employing a minor under fourteen year a of' age wa·s unconsti tu-
tional. (Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Company , 25'9 u • .s . 20.) 
By themselves, the more· progress! ve state a were handi-
capped in their eff'orts to improve induatrial eondi tiona and 
to enact social legislation, because they could not af'f'ord to 
place their industries at a · disadvantage in competing with 
similar industries in the more backWard ate.tes. 
Again and again bills for the establishment of unem-
ployment insurance presented in state legislatures f ailed of 
passage because of objections raised by employers in industries 
where labor represented a large proportion. of the coat of' 
goode produced. The.y argued, reasonably enough , that the 
a dde d coat of' contributions to an unemployment compensation 
f'und ~ould .force them out of business if they had to compete 
-14-
with employer a in other states where no ·such contributions 
were required. In industries operating on a narrow margin of' 
prof'it this w.o.s a matter of' vital concern. Manufacturers of' 
cotton textiles had already migrated in large numbers from 
the liew England states, where strict labor la-ws and hie;her 
wage levels existed, to the Southern states where cheap labor 
and comparative freedom from regUlation were to be found . 
The threat of migration from the etate, with ita wake of un-
employment and impoverishment_, was an ef'f'ective bar to the 
enactment of unemployment compensation .. 
The obVious. alternative. of a ;federal system of' unem-
ployment insurance was not attempted because o:f apparently 
insurmountable constitutional objections. Any attempt by the 
federal governme·nt to nasume direct responsibility for a 
nationwide scheme o:f unenu>loyment insurance would surely have 
been regarded as an infringement of "atate.s' rights." 
.In the face of' eha·ot1c condi tiona in .industry at the 
beginning of the Roosevelt administration in 1933, an attempt 
was made to .regulate a l l 1ndu.$tries enzaged in interstate com-
merce by means of code:a, under the Ne.. ti onal Recovery Act . Th1 s 
ambitious piece of legislation was hastily drawn; in retros-
pect, it appears in rnany ways to have been ill-considered, and 
1 t is small wonder that 1 t failed to meet the constitutionality 
test when it reached the Supreme Co~t. Upon its invalidation, 
-16-
the relatively :few industries which were at that time doing 
it more than lip service y abandmed their attempts_ to apply 
its provisions. 
In the meantime, however, -attempts to achieve nation-
wide uniformity in state legislation through the medium o:f 
credit provisions i n taxing statutes had met w1 th better suc-
cess in t he constitutionality tests applied _by the Supreme 
Court. 
The Revenu~ Act of 1924 contained a provision t hat 
cre.dit up to 25% of the :federal estate tax would be allowed 
:for death taxes paid to any state or territorial government. 
This credit was later increa-sed to 80~ . The effect of' the 
credit was two-fold-- it ·eliminated the double taxation which 
had heretof'ore been levied on estates o:f residents of those 
states which imposed an inheritance tn.x, and it stopped the 
exodus of' wealthy residents of' such states to other states 
VJhere no such taxes were levied. As a result of the federal 
lee;islation permitting the· credit allowance, most states now 
levy a ta;c of' not less· than BO% o.f the gross an1ount payable 
to the federal government under the 1926 Act . The Supreme 
Court has held that this provision of the Revenue Acts 1s not 
unconstitutional. 
The success of this device as an in~trument of social 
control in establishing 'tUliform estate tax laws among the 
states has led to its employment for control purposes in other 
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legislation where it was essential that producers in ·a given 
industry act in unison. Unde-r the Gu.ffey Coal Act, a h eavy 
tax was laid on producers of b1 tuminoua coal, _ a gainst w'uich a 
crt~di t of 99% was allowable to producers conforming to the 
t e r ms of the Act. The constituti-onality of this Act was up -
held in Carter v. Carter Coal Co • , 298 U. S . 238. 
The framers of the Social Security Act adopted this 
method of inducing the- vari ous states to enact unemploynent 
compensation la:ws. The consi tutionali ty- of t he pert inent pro-
visions of the Social Security Aet was upheld by the Supreme 
Court in Charles C. Steward !Jach ine Co. "V JAi.vis, on iay 24, 
193~. 
In order that the Social Se-curity Board may have con-
trol over the administration of unemployment -compen sation laws 
in the various states, it is provided that a state law_, to be 
approved by the Board for credit purpose.s,. must stipulate 
that none of the amounts collected from employers and employees 
as contributions to the state f'und may be exPe-nded f'or admin-
istrative purpose-s. This leaves the state administrative au-
thorities entirely dependent upon the federal administrative 
body for operating expenses, which are to be met by grants from 
the federal governmen t undle.r Title III of the Federal Social 
Security Act. In order to be approved for gran ts , the state 
law and the administrative organization must conform to the 
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standards aet by the .Social Security Board, and in order to 
continue to rece1 ve · such grants , the state agency must main-
tain satisfactory standards. 
(So far as the revenue is .concerned, the .amounts col-
lected from employers under Title IX of the Jl.ct are paid into 
the General Treasury of the United States, and the grants to 
states fol? adrninistrationof unemployment compensation laws 
·~ 
are paid out of the General Treasury. This method of proce-
dure is "consti.tutional."' Ho ever, if the Act had provided 
for a direct tax on employers to be used by the .fe :ieral g overn-
ment (instead of' the .states) :for paying unemployn1ent compensa-
tion b.enefi ts, 1 t would po S·Si bly have been held to be unconsti-
tutional. rore.over, i.f the Act had provided tbat amounts col-
lected under Title IX thereof' :as it now stands · ere to be used 
directly for grants to sta tea for the. purpoaea specified in 
the Act, it would seem that that too would have been unconsti-
tutional. The same ef:fect. is accoxnpliahed by having the re-
ceipts from ·taxes levied under Title IX paid into the General 
Treasury w1 thout being earmarked, and havine; the grants £or 
administrative purposes paid out o:f the General Treasury 1n-
stea4 of out of a special f'und, but the snag o:f unconstitut1on-
al1 ty 1 s thus a voided .. ) 
In view of the succeas ·ofthe credit provisions in a 
ta:xing statute, in .these instances, a.s a means of r .egulating 
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industry and effecting socially desirable state legislation, 
it would seem likely that this method will be utilized more 
and more in the future to apply fedel"al regulation to the 
entire country, and will furnish the federal authorities ith 
a means of enforcing such regulation, directly or indirectly~ 
in the several states. 
A :further de·velopment in the use of the credit provi-
sion as a social control is found in the pr·ovisions in the 
state lawc 'With respect to merit ratings under unemployment 
compensation laws. The object o:r such merit ratings is the 
stabilization of employment. Proponents of the merit-rating 
plan believe that by offering a r ·edueed contribution rate to 
the employer hose employment experience. is relatively stable, 
a state can, to some degree at least_, accomplish stabilization 
in employment within its borders. In this connection the 
.federal government permits the employer to whom such reduced 
rates are allowed to deduct as a credit. from the tax payable 
under Title IX, the amount (subject to certain limitations) 
vfuich he muld have paid as contributions if the mer1 t-rating 
provisions had not been applied. 
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Chapter III 
FEDERAL-STA 'l'E RELATIOUSHIPS UNDER 
1'HE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 
As has already been indicated, unemployment 1nBUrance 
in the United Sta.tea on a nationwide scale owes its existence 
to the uniformity of employer costa aecomp118hed through 
Title IX of the Social Security Act. 
Under Ti tle III of that Act, the federal government is 
authorized to make gx-ants to states £or &xpenae·a of a.dminls-
tration of unemployment compensation lawa. The amounts of the 
grants must be· passed upon by the Social Seeuri ty Board and 
are to be based upon "(l) the population of the State; {2) an 
estimate of the number o.f persone covered by the State law 
and of the cost of proper .admini.etration of aueh law; and (3) 
such otber factors as the Board find relevant." 
Section 303(a) of t he Social Security Act provides 
that such grants may not be made to a •tate unless the Social 
Security Board f'inds that ita unemployment compensation law, 
approved for credit purposes under T.i.tle IX,. includes provi-
sion for: 
'tl.) Such methods o·f' administration (other 
than those relating to selection, tenure of office, 
and compensat.i on of' personnel) as are found by the 
Board to be reas cnably cal.cula ted to insure full 
payment o:f unemployment com:Pensation when due; and 
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8 (2) Payme,nt of unempl.oyme.nt com~nsation 
solely through public employment off'iees. in tbe 
State ar St:tch other a gencies a& the Board may 
approve; and 
"{3) .Opportunity for a fa!r hearing, bef'ore 
an impartial tribunal,. for :&11 individuallJ hose 
c·lailna :for unemployment compensation are denied; 
and 
lt(4) iJ.'he payment of all money received in 
the unemployment i'und o·f such ·state, immediately 
upon such receipt, to the Secretary. o:f the 
Treasury to the credit of the Unemployment Trust 
Fund established by· :section 904; and 
"(5) Expenditure ot all money re-quisitioned 
by the State agency from the Unemployment Trust 
Fund, in the- payment of unentployment compensation ~ 
exclus-ive o:f expenses of adminiatr.ation; and 
"f>) The making of such r~port.a in such form 
and containing such inf·ormation, as the Board may 
f'rom time to tiln& require, and compliance with 
such provision~; e.a the Board may from time to 
time find neoe.ssary to assure the correctness and 
verl.fic.atlon o.f auch rep orts; and 
1t(7) Making available upon request to &.r.rJ' 
a gency of the United States Charged With the a d-
ministration of' publie orka' or aasistanee through 
public employment, the name, addre$s, ordinary 
occupation and employment status o:r ea.ch recipient 
of' unemployment compensation, and a atatemen t of' 
such recipient's rights to furthex-- compensation 
under such law." 
It will be seen that the Social Security Board !'..as a 
very def'inite control over the state s.dministrative a gencies, 
s1 nee i t is in position to w1 thdra.w 1 ts' approval and to 
-wi t bhold .federal grantff · tlenever i t appears that a atnte is 
not complying w1 th the .f·oregoing provisions or whenever there 
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is tta denial, ln a substantial number of cases, of unemploy-
ment compensation to i ndividuals en t! tled thereto under such 
law." {1) 
Under present procedures, t .he state a gencies p repare 
quarterly or semi-annual budgeta and, a:t'~er thes.e have be e n 
approved by' the Social Security Board, may rely upon t he 
:federal government to provide· funds for expens.es covered by 
such budgets .• 
The effect of Section :303 o~ the Socia1 Seclll'i t y Act 
is to place in the hands of the Social Securi ty Board the 
responsibility for seeing to it that the state administrative 
bodies carry out in .apir1 t as well as li ter:ally the· provisions 
o.f their respect! ve st•:te laws. '·The Board has found it neces-
sary, i n connection Td th atate granta under other titles o:f the 
Social Security Act, to withhold .funds pending compliance dth 
its requirement$. 
11'!ith respe.ct to unemployment adm1nia·trat1ve expenses, 
however, 1 t would appear that the Board baa, so far, not been 
called upon to take .so drastic a. :step as the '111 thholdlng of 
funda. The .f·act that 1.t has the power to do so is no doubt 
an impor tant f a .ctor in bring i ng a bout eompliariee with its sug-
gestions d t h r ·espect to. state a dministra tion. 
(1 } Section 303(b) (1) o£ the Social Security Act .. 
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Moreover 1 1 t would appear that the. ,aim of the Board 
has been to offer guidance and ndvico rather than :minute 
supervisi-on, and especially in view of the fact that the 
whole program is in the experimental stag•~ to allo the states 
wide latitude in the administration of their respective unem-
pl.oyment insurance law:s. 
liotwithstanding that a11 of the state laws are based 
upon the ttdra.ft bill"·. prepared by the Social See.uri ty Board, 
eaeh state law differs in many ways .from that of other states. 
Accordingly, at the present time, the various state ae;encies 
may be reg$.rded as laboratories in wh1-ch different pla..'~'l.8 nnd 
procedures f'or the payment o.f unemp1oyment insurance are being 
tried out. After a fe years, it ·will. be possible, on the 
basis of experience in the different states, to determine 
which plans for paying benefits are the moat desirable and 
which procedures .for the determination am payment of. benef'i ts 
are the moat practicable. 
That the power to w1 tbhold e.xpense grants may b e exer-
cised to influence conformity by the atates to other federal 
legislation is 1ndicatod in the Railroad Unemployment Insur-
ance Aet, in which 1 t is provided that, in the. case o:f state 
agencies which f'ail to turn over to the Railroad. Retirem-ent 
Board the funds required by that Act to be so transferred, 
all grants wbich would otherwise be made for admini1atrative 
-23-
expenses will 1natead be paid ovor to the Railroad Retirement 
Board to be a pplied against t he amount whi-ch should have been 
transferred .. 
A f"urther means of f'&deral . control lieS.: in the credit 
provisions of Titl:e IX of the Social Security Act .,. since, as 
explained in t:h& previous chapter, the· :refu.aal of the Bocial 
Security Boax•d to approve a atat.e law fo~ credit purpo es 
would almo·et double the amount payable by the employer. It 
i.s there.f'ore incumbent upon employers. to see that their state 
la: and .1 ta adrniniJJtrat.ion continue to meet the. reqt1irements 
of the Social Secun ty Board w.1 th respect to eredi t require-
ments. 
As S·tated before, the prov151ons f'or credit allo'llmces 
under Title I X have brought about s:tandaroization of contribu-
tion rate.s at 2.'7% of the total payroll.. The provisions with 
respect to additional credit allowances to employers whose 
contribution rates are reduced in accordance w1 th rrmeri t rat-
ingn plans should also tend to an sur·e uniformity among the 
states. with reepect to such pl.ans. 
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Chapter IV 
COVERAGE OF UNEMPLOYM$NT C011PENSATI.ON JAWS 
At the pr.esent time, the lawa of' th& individual statea 
vary considerably with respect to cover.age,.. so i'ar a s. the 
size of the employer unit i.s concerned~ In about hal.f of' the 
sta.tes, the law f'ollow:s, in this P8spect 1 the provisions of · 
Title IX of' the Social Security Act, by holding subject to 
liability all 8ploye~a of ei~t or more individuals in each 
of twenty different weeke during a c..alendar year. (l) In 
other states the provisions vs:ry, many of' them .applying to em-
pl.oyera of one or more individual• ... (2.) 
In Massachusetts, the law as originally passed app11ed, 
in genera.l, to employers or eight or more, but by amendment 
in 19:37 was extended to emplo"Yer8 of four or more beginning 
January 1, 1939. 
Title IX of the Social Security Act excludes f'rom lia-
bility thereunde.r, employers or individuals engaged in: 
ttl) Agricultural labor; 
"(2) Domestic .service in a private home; 
"(3) Service. pe.rfonned as an o.f!ieer or mem-
ber o.f the crew of' a vessel ·on the navigable waters 
of the United .States; 
(1) Alabama, Alaska, Co~orado, _Florida, Georgia, Illinois, 
Indiana, Kans:as, Maine, ~YI1chigan, Miasissippi., Uissouri, 
Nebraska., New Jersey, North Caro'lina,. South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Texas,. Vermont, Virgina.,. Washington, and West Virgina. 
(2) Arkans.as, District of Columb:ia, Hawaii, Idaho, !i inneaota, 
Montana, l~evada, Pennayl vania., and Wyoming. 
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" ( 4) Service performed by an individual in 
the employ of his son, daughter, or spouse, and 
service· performed by a. child under the age of 
twenty-one in the employ of his father or mother ; 
"(5) Service per.formed in the empl.oy of the 
United State.s Government or of an instTUmentality 
of the United States; 
" ( 6) Service performed in the employ of a 
State, a political subdivision thereof, or an 
instrumentality of one or more States or politi-
cal subdivisions; 
"(7) Service performed in the employ of a 
corporation, community chest, fund, or .foundat1.on, 
organized and operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, scientific, literary, or educational 
purposes, or for the prevention o.f cruelty to 
chiHiren or an1mala, no part of the net earnings 
of which 1nure.a to the benef'it o.f any private 
shar.eholder or individual."' 
In connection with t he foregoing , the following recom-
mendations of the Social Security Board are o:f interest: (1) 
"In unemployment compensation as in old-age insurance, 
t he Boa.rd believes that it is administratively feasible and 
in accordance· with sound social policy to include t he employ-
ments not covered by present Federal provisions, w1 t h a :f.ew 
exceptions. 
"The employments for which the ~oard does not recom-
mend inclusion at thi .s time are: ordinary farm labor, domestic 
(1) See pages 14 - 15 of rer;ort of Social Security Board to 
the President, dated December 30, 1938, transmitted to 
Congress with President's Message dated January 16, 1959. 
House of Representatives, Document No . 110., 76th Congress 
lat. Session. 
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service in pri va.te homes, f ·amily employment, and service for 
the Federal or State governments or their i nstrumentalities. 
"Problema relating to agricultural emploY!J!ent.--The 
situation of a gricultural employees is i'requently dii'ferent 
from that in moat other occupations. Farm employees often 
either own small f'arms of their own, or live in homes p rovided 
by the employer with the use of land and equipr1ent to produce 
a part of their subsistence. Vllille it seems .feasible to cover 
such persons in old-age insurance, in unemployment compensa-
tion there are unusual problems. For example, in many case:s 
1 t would be extremely di .f.ficul t to determine whether t he indi-
vidual should be considered •unemployed,' or vhether he is 
normally working i'or himself. Viliile some fo·reign systems have 
been extended to cover agricultural employees., it must be rec-
ognized that the agricultural wage earning group in this coun-
try is much less clearly defined. It therefore appears in-
advisable to recommend at this time the. extension ·Of unemploy-
ment insurance to cover all a gricultural employees. However, 
just as in the case of old-age insurance, the Board recom-
mends that the language of the present exception rela tine; to 
'agrlcul tural labor t in any event should be modified to make 
certain that this exception applies only to the services of 
a .farmhand employed by a small farmer to do the ordinary :ork 
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connected ith his farm. ~1e Board will continue to study 
the problems involved and will :aake every ef'.fort to develop 
practical ways and means of bringing about extension to all 
a gricultural employees. 
"Problems relating; to domestic service.--In the case 
of domestic service in a private home, the difficulties of ex-
tending unemployment compensation are far less serious than in 
agriculture. The fact of unemployment is much easier to de-
termine. The chief problem here relates to the de termination 
and collection of contributions. The Board belie.ves domestic 
employees can and should be covered by the unemploymen t insur-
ance provisions of the act, provided sufficient time is allo ed 
for t he States to perfect their administrative procedures. 
"Problems relating to State and Federal employment.--
Employment by a State government or its instrumental.ities must 
continue to be excluded from Federal unemployment compensation 
provisions for the reasons ·cited in connection with old-age 
insurance. The Board does not believe there would be any 
great advantage in i nel uding Federal empl-oyees under t he unem-
ployment compensation provisions. Civil-service employees are, 
for the most part, already protected against t he hazard of 
unemployment, and it 1ould probably be more practical to pro-
vide for non-civil-service employees through some form of dis-
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missal wage rather than through establi.shing a special ration-
v:ide unemployment eompe.nsation system. 
"However, the Board does believe that so-called instru-
mentalities of the Federal Government which are not wholly 
ovmed by it--such as national banks--should be brought into 
State unemployment compensation as well as under old-age insur-
ance. 
lfNonpro.f'it. organizationa.--The Board reconnnends the 
inclusion .o:f service performed in the employ of nonprofit or-
ganizations. The Board anticipates no serious administra-
tive difficulties in such inclusion. 
''Family em;elo:yment.--In order to avoid serious admin-
istrative difficulties in the payment of unemployment compen-
• 
sation benefits , the Board believes that the ·exclusion of' 
family employment should 'be retained. u 
With respect to unemployment compensation f'or seamen, 
the report (page 16) contains the following statement: "Un-
der the Constitution 1 t is impossible to confer upon the c:ota.tes 
jurisdiction over marl time employment , r.i th the possible ex-
ception ot: that incidental to employment on land. Therefore, 
in order to afford unemployment compensation protection to 
seamen it would be necessary to pa ss a Federal act. The 
Board recom.•·ne·nds that such an act be passed coverin g all mari-
time employment which cannot be brought under Sta t e la :1s, wl th 
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th& exceptions noted under old-age insurance.» 
While it may be some time before the coverage can be 
extended to cover all the groups enumerated by the Board, 
the trend is definitely in that direction. 
The Board further recommends in the above-quoted re-
port (page 16}" that 11 the present Federal re~triction to em-
ployers .iho have had 8 or more employees in 20 or more eeks 
during the year be. eliminated so that the unemplo7:{nlent com-
pensation provisions would cover all those having one or more 
employees , just a a in tho -Caae of old-age insurance. Twenty-
.four State unemployment compensation laws already cover 
smnlJe r employers than tl1.ose included in the Federal act ns 
it no stands; of these, 10 cover employers o.f one or more." 
It is interesting to compare the trend toward exten-
s.ion of cove,rage in the United States., as- indicated above, 
w1 th the experience in foreign countries, particularly Great 
(1) Britain: 
"As first establiah&d, the Bri tish unemployment insur• 
ance sys tem provided ·cover-age f'or only 2,500,000 orkers in .a 
few se.lected manual trades (mechanical enginee-rinr;, building, 
(1) As summarized in ttsocial Security in lunerlca," pp . 20 - 21 
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iron founding, s h ipbuilding , construction of verdcles, sa 1 
millin g , and machine wor k) having a high and .similar incidence 
of unen ployment. In 1916 workers engaged on or in connection 
ith munitions work in any trade, as well as v.orkers in the 
metal , chemical, lea ther , r ubber , and brick trades--a total 
oi.' about 1 , 250,000 people--wore a dded to the system .. "'"1e f ol-
lo\ ine; yeo.r, 1917, 1 t was recom11ended that t he insurance' sch eme 
be extended to all itrorkers, and on November 8, 1 92u, the scheme 
became practically universal. All manual workers a nd all non-
manual l orkors earning less t han .at the rate of 15250 a year 
were brought w1 thin the sys tem, except agricultural workers, 
domestic servants, permanent employees on the railroads , cer-
tain employees o·f' local authorities and of the poor-law and 
asy llun authorities, and cert ain employees in public-utility 
companies. Under a mending legisla tion, t..lie mininru1n a ge rvas 
set at the school-leaving a ge nnd the maximum at 64. 
11 In July 19.35, 14,003,000 per'sons 16 to 64 years of' 
a ge , inclu sive, ere covered by unemployment insurance in 
Gr eat Britain and Northern Ireland. " 
The unemployment insurance statutory committee, in ac-
eordanc·e w1 t h t h e provisions of' the act of' 1934, nmde a s tudy 
of agricu ltural coverage. (1) nA report i ssued b ., this stat 
(1) "Report of' Unemployment Insurance Statutory Cominlttee, 11 
in accordance vTit h sec . 20 of the Unemployment Insurance 
.Act~ 1 934 , on the question of the insurance against unem-
ploymen t of pe rsons engaged in empl oyment in a griculture 
(Cmd.478 6 ), January, 1 935. 
utory committee in January 1935 recommended the establish-
ment of unemployment. insurance Tor a gri,eul tural m .rkera, with 
lower rates of contribution and benef'it than those v.hich ob-
tain for the general unemployment insurance system. The com-
mittee reeornnended f urther thnt unpaid family labor, special 
seasonal workers (unless the worker so employed is already 
covered by insurance), and private gardeners should be ex-
cluded from coverage. In the opinion of the Committee spe-
cial provisions exempting employees but not employers f'rom 
contrib\.l tions will be neeessnry f'or piece-work contra:ets and 
for Irish migratory labor. 
"The m .in rea'""ons for the recommendation of a separate 
account .fur· aericul tural workers are the following: ( 1 ) The 
gener~l level o£ money wages is lower than in other industries; 
{2) unemployment in a griculture, though substantial, is less 
than in the insured industries taken as a whole; (3) · agri-
culture should not be made liable to the debt incurred by the 
unemployment insurance f'und during tr..e pe.Bt 14 years. n 
On April 9, 1936, the unemployment insurance act f'or 
agricultural workers became a law. Contri buttons became pay-
able beginning !Jay 5:1 ~936, and benef'i ts beginning November 5, 
1936. It was estimated that "'/50~000 agricultural workers 
would be covered by the British Act. 
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. Chapte.r V 
DUAL FUNCTION OF S'TA TE AGElTCIES 
WITH RESPECT TO tnmr~ PLOn1ENT 
Throughout the United State$, the administration of the 
state unemployment compensation laws has been coordinated With 
the maintenance ol' public employment of'f'ice.a, on the theory 
that the primary object of the state agency -should be the pl.ac-
ine of the unemployed individual in suitable employment, and 
that the payme.nt of benefits should be considered as a 11 stop-
gap11 only to be used when suitable empl.oyment cannot be f01.md. 
In other words, the obj.ective ia to keep the insured 
individual continuously employed if' pes sible . and to .minimize 
the frequency and the duttation of his periods of unemployment. 
The waiting period requirement provides the worker 
with an 1ncent1 ve t ·o re:ma in con tlnuously employed since , under 
provisions. varying in the diffe.rent states, he must wait two 
or three or four weeks before beeomrrJ..ng eligible .for ·benefits. 
1oreover, since the benefit paJ'lllentJ subject to the maximum 
and minimwn limitations provided for in the law, is only ap-
proximately one-half' of his weekly wage, the worker will not, 
except in rare instances, pre:fer unemployment benefits to 
wngea . 
In mo.s t states, the unemployed individual also has an 
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incentive to accept partial employment since the state a gency 
undertakes to pay him the difference between partial earnings 
and hi s weekly benefit rate. Of the forty-four jurisdictions 
which pay partial benefits, twenty-four do so whenever weekly 
earnings fall below six-fifths (6/5ths) of the eekly benefit 
amount which would have been payable for total nnemplo.yment. 
The Connecticut Law (Section .5e) is typical of the law of 
e i 5 h t of the states which use the weekly benefit amount as a 
basis: 
"An eligible individual who is partially nn-
employed throughout a week, which shall be, at 
the discretion of the administrator, either a 
calendar eek .or a payroll week of seven consecu-
tive days as determined by the administrator, 
shall be ~id w1 th respect to such week an amq1m.t 
equal to v2.00 more than the excess of his bene-
fit rate for total nnemployment over the total 
remuneration of any nature payable to him for 
services of any kind during such week, provided 
his weekly benefit for partial unemployment shall 
in no even t exceed his benefit rate· for total un-
employment. An ind1 vidual shal.l be deemed to be 
partially unemployed throughout a week if he has 
failed to earn in that week rennmeration of any 
nature of at least the amonnt of his. benefit rate 
for total unemployment." 
It seema probable that the few states which do not pay 
partial benefits at the present time will soon enact provi-
sions authorizing such payments. Already they have been pro-
posed as amendments to the ?<~assachusetts and :New York laws 
which are undergoing revision by the respective state legis-
latures. 
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(In the states l!hich do not pay partial benefi~ including 
r assachusetts, ]·i ssiasippi, Ne York and Pennsylvania, there 
is little incentive for the individual to a·ccep·t partial em-
ployment especially since earnings from odd jobs or subsi-
diary work amounting to .from ~3 .00 to .,..5.00 will d1squall.f'y 
him from re-ceiving any benefits in the week in which such em-
ployment occurs.} 
In an attempt to give. t he employer a special incen-
tive to stabilize employment in his own establishment, vary-
ing p rovisions have been inserted ~ the state laws, all of 
them designed in one way or another to relate the rate of 
contribution to the degree of unemployment attributed to the 
particular employer. 
The social Security Act recognizes the principle of 
merit rating by providing in Section 909(a) as follows: 
tt(a) In addition to the crec.tl.t allowed under 
section 902, a taxpayer may, subject to the con-
di tions imposed by section 910, cr.edi t against 
t he tax 1mposed by section 901 for any taxable 
year after the taxable year 1937, an ·amount, w1 th 
respect to each state la , equal to the amount, 
if any, by Which the contributions, wi th respect 
to employment in s.uch taxable year, actually 
paid by the taxpayer under such law before the 
date of :filing his return for s\ICh taxable year, 
is exceeded by michever o:f t h e following is the 
lesser--
(1) 'I'he amount of contributions which 
he would have been required to ~y under such 
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law for such taxable year if he had been sub-
j ect to the highest rate applicable from time 
to time throughout s uch year to any e mployer 
under s.uch la 'W; or 
(2) Two and seven-tenths per c entum of 
t he wages payable b y him wl th respect to er.t-
ployment with respect to wlllch contributions 
for s uch y ear were required under such law. 
"(b} If the amount of the contributions 
actually eo paid b y the taxpayer is les.s than the 
amount which he should have paid under t he Stat& 
law, the ad.dit1ona1 credit und.er subsection (a) 
sl~ ll be reduced proportionately. 
" (c) The to tal cl"edi ts allowed . to a tax-
payer under tbis title aball not exceed. 90 per 
centum e .f the tax a gainst which such credits are 
taken." 
However, the Act sets certain limits on t he al~owance 
of the a dditional credit by providing, in Section 910 as 
follows: 
"{a} A taxpayer .shall be allowed t h e addi-
tional credit under section 909 , with respect 
to his contribution rate under a State .law being 
lower,. for any taxable year, than that of another 
employer subject to such law, only if the Board 
finds that under such law--
(1) Such lower rate, with respect to 
contributions to a pooled fund, is permitted 
on the ba.si s of not leas than t h ree year!! of' 
compensation experience; 
{2) Such lower ra'te, with respect to 
contributions to a guaranteed employment ac-
count, is permitted only when h!a guaranty 
of employment was fulfilled in the preceding 
calendar year, and such guaranteed emp1oy-
ment account · amounts to not les.s than 7~ per 
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centum of the total wages payable by him~ 
in accordance with such guaranty, with res-
pect to en::ploymen t in e:uch State in the pre-
ceding calender year; 
(3) Sueh lower rate, w1 th respect to 
contributions to a separate reserve account, 
is permitted only hen (A) compensation has 
been payable from such account throughout 
the preceding calendar year, and (B) such 
account amounts to not less than five time a 
the largest amount of contpensa tion paid .from 
such account w1 thin any one of the three 
preceding calendar yeara, and (C·) such wages 
payable by him (plus the total wagee payable 
by any other employers 11ho may be contri-
buting to such account) w1 th respect to em-
ployment in such State in the preceding cal-
endar year. 
"{b) Such additional. credit shall be reduced, 
if any con tributiona under such la:w are made by 
such tajtpaye:r at a lower rate under condi tiona 
not fulfilling the requirements of subsection (a), 
b y the amount bee.ring ·the aame ratio to such ad-
d! tional cred1 t as the amount of contributions 
made at s-uch lower rate bears to the total of hi a 
contribu.tions paid .for such year under such la: . " 
The Act also defines the varloue terme used in this 
section as follow&: 
· " ( 1) The term "re$erve account" means. a 
separate account in an unemployment fund, with 
respect to an employer or group o.f e~ployers, 
from which compensation is payable only with 
respect to the unemployment o.f 1ndi vi.duals, ho 
were in the employ of such .employer, or of one 
o:f the -employers comprising the group. 
"(2) The term ttpooled !und1 means an unem-
ployment. .fund or any part thereof in whi·ch all 
contributions are mingled and undi v1ded., and 
from which compen~tion is payable to all ell-
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gible individuals, except that to individuals 
last employed by empl oyers with respect to hon 
reserve accounts are 1naintamed by the state 
agency, it is payable only ·hen such accounts 
are ex.."lausted. 
" ( 3) T'ne tarm "guaranteed enploynen t ac-
count" means a separate account, in o.n une:m-
ployr.tent fu.."ld, of contributions paid by an em-
ployer {or group of o.mployers) who 
{A) guarantees in advance thirty 
hours of gee for each of forty calendar 
eeks (or more, with one eakly hour de-
ducted for each added eek guaranteed} in 
twelve months, to all the individual• in 
his employ 1n one or more distinct e.atab-
liahments, except that any such indivi-
dual's guaranty may commence af'ter a pro-
bationary period (included within twelve 
or less consecutive calendar weeks), and 
(B) · gives security or assurance, 
satis.factory to the State agency, f'or the 
fulfillment of such guaranties. 
from whi ch account compensation .t\hall be :r;:a.y-
able with respect to the unemployment of such 
ind.l vidual whose guaranty is not fulfilled or 
rene ed and mo ia other\1ise eligible for com-
pensation tmder the State la.w .. 
11 (4) The term "year of eornpensat1on ex-
perience", ns applied to n.n employer .• means 
any calendar yenr throughout hieh compensa-
tion was payable vli th respect to any indivi-
dual in his employ \vho be-ca"ne unemployed and 
was e11r;ible for compensation. n· 
Under the provisions quoted above, reductions in em-
ployer contribution rates made under the various state laws 
will not be recognized for purpos.es of the "additional credl t 
"'·· 
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allowance" against the federal tax until the state has had at 
least three years of benefit paying experi.ence. Only V'iiscon-
sin could quali.fy befo.re 1941. By January 1, 1941, all of 
t h e states which began paying bene:fits on January 1, 1938, 
will be in position to reduce rates on the basis of three 
years of compensation experience. In some o:f the states hav-
ing pooled funds, the law contains de.fini te provi.sions regard-
ing merit ratin •s; in others, the law merely requires that 
pertinent data be accumulated by t he agency~ A table summar-
izing the merit rating provisi ens of' the various state laws 
is appended hereto. 
In any eve·nt, since the Social Security Board is 
charged with "the duty of studying and making recommendations 
as to the most e.ffective methods of providing economic security 
through social insurance and as to legislation and matters o.f 
administrative policy concerning * * * "unemployment compensa-
tion **and related subjects," (l) it would seem that experi-
ence under the unemployment compens.ation lawa of the various 
states would have to be studied in some detai£ in connection 
with the effort to bring about economic security through sta-
bilization of employment. 
(1) Section 702, Social Securi ty Act. 
- -- - ------· 
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Chapter VI 
VARIOUS TYPES DF EMPLOYER RESERVE SYSTEMS 
The e-ssential elements of' the employer re-serve sys-
tem are three: 
-(1) Employers alone contribute to the reserve. 
(2) The contri.butions of' e.ach employer, though 
mingled with those of others t:or aat'ekeeping and 
i.nvestment purposes, are kept d1.stinct like an ac-
count in a bank 1 and can he used to pay benef'i t s 
only to his own laid-of'.f employees. 
(3 ) The rate of contribution of' each employer 
varies directly and automatically with the size of' 
his reserve account. (1} 
This type o:f fund is based on the assumption that each 
employer should bear the cost of benef'.its paid to individuals 
laid off by him. Whenever the balance in his reserve account 
:falls below a certai.n ratio to his annual payroll, hl s con-
tribution rate is increased; whenever the balance exceeds a 
specif'ied ratio, his contribution r .ate 1s diminished or he 
(1) See "The Employer Reserve Type of Unemployment Compen-
sation Law" by Elizabeth Brandeis. "Law and Contemporary 
Problems" Vol. iii, No. 1, School of Law, Duke University. 
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may be excused altogether .fro:m making :further .contributions 
while that ratio is maintained. 
In foreign countries, there does not seem to have been 
any idea of adjusting rates .for individual employers, or any 
contributions scheme which would correspond to the employer 
reserve system as established in the United States . ....uch 
variations in contribution rates as have existed have been 
applicable to employers as a group without respect to their 
individual unemployment experience, either on the basis o.f .a 
.flat rate :for all covered employers :in the ·COtmtry or w1 th 
variati-ons based upon district groupings 1n accordance wi th 
the employment exper.ience .for the district. 
An employer re·serve system bas been 1n operation in the 
State of Wisconsin since the inception o:f the unemployment 
compensa tion law in that State . Contributions have been col-
lected from employers since July, 1934. Bene:fita have been 
payable to eligible individuals ho were unemployed on July 
1, 1936, snd tberca:fter .. 
Under the ~iisconsin plan, each employer's contributions 
are credited to his individual ~ccount and all bene:f1ts pa.id 
to h1 s worker. a 1 ba~ed. upon past employm~nt by him, are charged 
a gainst his account. The earnings from the investments o:f the 
:fund are credl ted to a "poole d :fund, " which 1 s used to finance 
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payments to an individual a.fter his f'orme·r employers' reserve 
accounts have been exhausted. 
It :is interesting to note the experience under the 
··1sconsin law, as indic~ted in a table recently issued by the 
nemployment Compensation Department of the Industrial Com-
mission of Wisconsin. This table shals the ratio of' benef'its 
paid during the period :from July 1, 1936, to June 30 , 1938 , 
to former employees of the 4108 employers who becrune liable 
for contributions in July, 1934. Such employers had been pay-
ing contribut~ons for four years and had been chargeable 1th 
bene.f1 ts for two years. A sunnnary of t.beir e.A-perience is as 
follows: 
No . of Employers 
850 
1079 
613 
574 
282 
183 
148 
~ 
95 
79 
99 
106 
Total----4108 
==== 
athdrawal Percentages 
No w1 thd.rawals 
Over 0 and under 5 
Over 5 
" " 10 
" 
10 If tl 20 
tt 20 
" " 30 
" 30 " " 40 
" 40 " " 50 
.ft 50 " n 60 
" 
60 n 
" 
70 
" 
70 n II 100 
Overdrawn 
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Notwithstanding that 106 of these employer accounts 
had been exhausted by June 30 , 1938~ no claimant had been 
denied benefits for that reason, beeause the "pooled" acco1.mt 
had been used for payment.s to individuals whose former em-
ployer.s' accounts had been exhausted. The Department reports 
that at the end of 1938, there was a balance of about 
850,000 in the "pooled" account, after similar benef'it pay-
ments ageregating $490,000 had been charged against that ac-
count. 
It will be seen !'rom the foregoing that over 90%. of' 
the above employers had had charged against their reserves, 
during a two-year peli od when employment might be said to have 
been below normal, less than half' the -.mount contributed by 
them during a .four-year period, and that less than 3% of them 
had "overdrawn" their re.se.rve·a. 
The employers in a second gr:-oup comprised 555 accounts 
representing c ontr1 butiona. over a period of three and a half 
years and benerit payments during eighteen months. Their 
withdrawal :p&rcentages are indicated a.s followa: 
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No. of' Em]2lozers Withdrawal Percentases 
168 No withdrawals 
124 Over 0 and under 5 
65 ft 5 ... It 10 
76 
" 
10 .tt· tt 20 
42 " 20 ft " 30 
29 " ro 1f " 40 
11 " 40 
lt It 50 
Oil) 
10 
" 
50 If tt 60 
a 
" 
60 .. " 70 
10 n 70 " 
tf 100 
12 Overdrawn 
-
Total---555 
~
This group also showed more than 90% o:f the accounts 
w1 th withdrawal percentages of le sa than half' the amount con-
tributed, and a fairly high percentage against which no bene-
f1 t a had been drawn. 
The Department report-a (l) that "baaed on their favor-
able record through the close of 1938:. more than 1500 em-
ployers will have their rate reduced (from 2.7,& ) to 1% for 
(1) See Biennial Report of Industrial Commission of' .Tiaconsin 
for 1936 - 1938. 
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1939 . On the other hand, an increaned rate ( 3. 2%) ·:;ill ap-
ply to several hundred employers \~Ose accounts show an un-
favorable experience. 
Uhile the Wisconsin law requires that the entire amount 
of t he e.1 ployers' contributions be credited to their indivi-
dual accounts, other states have employer reserves in co -
bination with a pooled account, with employer contributions 
spl i t i n various ways . Juch plans are indicated i n t he f ol-
lowing table: (1) 
Indiana 
Ken t ucl..-y 
Nebraska 
Oregon 
South Dakota 
Vermont (2 ) 
Proportion Credited 
to Employer Reserve 
5/6ths 
all 
all 
95 ~ 
5/6tha 
all 
Proportion Credited 
to Pooled Fund 
l/6th 
Employee cont ribu-
tions only 
l/6th 
all 
(l) Schedule entitled "Slgnlf'lcant provisions of' State Un.,m-
ployment Compensation Laws, January 1,. 1939 ,n issued by 
Social Security Board . 
(2) Pooled fund with merit rating or e m:t;loyer reserve as 
employer elects. 
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Chapter VII 
GUARANTEED EMPLODIENT PLANS 
Under three o£ the atate lawa, employe·rs are exempt 
f'rom 11ab1li ty thereunder if' they s.a tiaf'y certain require-
ments as to guaranteed employment. SUeh exemptions are per-
ml tted in connection w1 th emp~oyer reserves as well aa with 
pooled .funds. The :following ata.tes permit such exemptions: 
that 
Cali.fornia 
Idaho 
Indiana 
Minnesota 
:Tzpe ~f Fund 
Pooled, merit rating 
Pooled, merit rating 
Employer reserve 
Poo1ed, merit rating 
The Social Security Act (Section 910 (a)) provides 
"{A) A taxpayer shall be allo11ed the addi-
tional credit under se.ct1.on 909, W1 th respect 
to his contribution rate under .a Sta.te law be-
ing lower, .for any taxable year, than that of 
another employer subject to such law, only if' 
the Board .finda that tmder such law:.- ~" * * 
(2) Such lower rate, with respect to 
contributions to a guaranteed employment account, 
is permitted only when his guaranty of employ-
ment was .fulf'illed in the preceding calendar 
year, and such guaranteed emplo-yment cu~count 
amounts to not leas than 7i per centum of' the 
total wages payable by him, ln accordance w1 th . 
such guaranty, with respect to employment in 
such State in the preceding ealendazw year_; * * * 
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A tt guaranteed ·&lllPlo,ment ace:ount n mean• •a separate 
accollllt. in an employ.ment .fUnd, of oontr1but1ona pa1d b an 
employer (or group of -x>loyera) who 
tt (A) guarantees 1n advance thir-ty hour a· o~ 
vagea ~or e oh o£- f'orty ()Ue.ndar weeka {or :more. 
W'1 ·tb one e~kly hour deducted ~or •ach added 
wek g~teod) 1n tw•lve. months, to all the 
1ncU.v1d.uala in b1a otnplo:y in one or .mo-r;• d1at1nct. 
eatabl1ahbtentJf, ucopt that tln7 auch individual 'a 
suaranty may co~nce oi'ter a ~bat10fllll'7 period 
{1nclu4ed w1th1n twolw ox- leas conaeout1ve eal-
end.ar weeka), and 
11 (B) g1ve.a security or suran.ce, :aat1a.t"ac-
tory to the State agency., for thfJ tul.f'll~~t or 
auch gnaranttea, 
from 1b1cb CJ;ccount compensation ahall b& _payable 1 th 
re.apeet to th• uttemployment . ·of -any sUCh indiVidual 
· ose guaranty 1a net fulfilled or rene.wod and who 
la othorwi .,Dl.lgibl·& ~or compenaatJ.on under· the. 
state law.·" .lJ . 
It 1f111 be noted tbat the add1t1onal.. credit allowance 
18 available to · IPlO:y'i r• gu.arantc.e1ng Glfqllo31Qent only when 
the- employer baa contributed t.o tho atate fund an CL"ttount BUf.-
f1o1ent to· maintain h1a cco1m.t at '7:., or hia total annual 
nayroll, -.nd that aatiatactory aasuranc.& mwst be given the. 
state agency that the gnal'ant e of emplo,ment 111 be :tul-
.f'il~ed. 
The Gal1torn1a l w requ1re.s that th& l'l11.nhmlm guarantee 
be ae .fallon: 
{l) 8ectl·on 910 .(c.) {3) of' the Social Securi ty /\Ct. 
Minimum Weeka Minimum Hours 
Duration Fer Week 
42 36 
43 34 
44 32. 
45 .30 
46 28 
4? 26 
48 24 
49 22 
50 20 
The Indiana law provides (Sec·tion 7 (c) (1)) that the 
''Board shall appi""ove and penni t a guaranteed plan only when 
the employer guarantees in advance, to all 1nd1v1duala in his 
employ in one or more distinct establishments, thirty hours 
o:f work at a rate speci.fied in advance for ·each employee for 
each o:f forty separate week a within twelve conseeuti ve months. 
\'Vnere an employer guarantees to his employees more than forty 
separate weeks w1 thin twelve consecutive montha, for each such 
.extra guaranteed week one hour may be deducted, as to all 
guaranteed. weeks, from the number o.f guaranteed weekly hours 
otherwise applicable.~ 
With respect to contribution rates applicable in 
Indiana to such employers, the rate is 2.7% until after bene-
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fits have been payable from such accounts during the preceding 
calendar year. Thereafter, if an employer's reserve is equal 
to at least :five times the largest amount of benefits. charged 
against the account during any year, his contribution rate 
shall be 2% if hia reserve is between 7.5% and 12% of his an-
nual payroll for the preceding year and 1% if the balance is 
between 12% and 17% of' such annual payroll. If' such ratio is 
more than 17% at the beginning of the calendar year no contri-
bution wil l be .r ·equired for the year. 
Further provision is made in the Indiana law for im-
mediate increase of the employer's monthly rate to 3.7% hen-
ever, in t he preceding month, it has been necessary to draw on 
the pooled fund because his reserve fund or guaranteed employ-
men t account is not sufficient to pay the benefits due in full. 
With respect to guaranteed employment under the r ~innesota 
law, Regulation 34 provides as follows: 
"(2) 'Guaranty of employment' means a plan 
of guaranteed employment approved by the commis-
sion, in advance for stated one-year periods, of 
not less tr~ thirty (30) hours of wagea for 
each of forty ( 40) calendar weeks (or more, vl th 
one week.J.y hour deducted for each added week 
guaranteed) within a calendar year, to all indi-
viduals in his employ in one or more distinct 
establiehments (and to each employer who is there-
after employed and continued in employment after a 
total of eight (8) weeks of employment included 
ithin pwelve or less conaecutive calendar eek s.u 
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The Minnesota law also provides that employers who 
have established a. guaranteed employment account and have 
built u p n balance th.e·rein of ?~'% of their. previous annual 
payroll sha11, after the ceJ.endar year 1938, be required to 
contribute at a rate -of only 5/10% of' the previous annual 
payroll. 
The object of such provi·sions is the same as that of' 
merit ratings under pooled funds or rate adjustments under 
reserve funds, i.e., the stabilization of' employment. However, 
a guarantee of fi:fty weeks' employment at twenty hours per 
week would etabilize nt a very low level, since the worker 
would be receiving hal:f pay or less (on the basis of' a full 
week of forty hours or m~) throughout the year. 
"Although a substitute f'or unemployment compensation, 
guaranteed employment has many dissimilar characteristics. 
The protection which it affords the worker at the beginning 
of' a contract year is superior to unemployment compensation, 
since tile worker is guarant&$d a. specified income during the 
year. As time goes on, however, the guarantee means le .s.s and 
~e .ss during the year until at the end -of the specified number 
of weeks it expires .entirely and unemployment after that date 
is uncompensated. Furthermore, at the end of a contract year, 
if' the contract is not renewed, the worker has no protection 
derived from his past employment unless provision is so made. 
-50-
ffThe employers Who elect to set up a euarL~teed employ-
ment account are those wno, because of th& atab111ty of their 
employment , Mill feel confident that they can fUlfill the 
g-..:tarantee by providing wor k , thus .avoiding pa~ent out of 
t heir ruarantee fund. Care, however, must be exercised to 
assure actual protection .fully as adequate as U.l''lemployment 
compensation. The employee should not be le.ft stranded nt the 
end of a contract year ~ithout any protection derived from 
long periods of emplojJnent." (1 ) 
( 1) Social Security in America, Pp. 112, 113 . 
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Chapter VIII 
'THE POOLED FUND PLAN. 
A pooled 1'und system may be de.finod o.a a system of un-
eraploymen t insurance in whieh all contributions are mingled 
ru1d undivided in one fund, from Which unemployment compensa-
tion ia payable to all eligible 1ndi.v:!.du.nla. i;o employer or 
empl.oyee has a prior claim or right. to any amo1mts hich have 
been contributed to the fund. 
In a "straight t r pooled .fund system,. there is no pro vi-
sion for adjusting the individual employer's annual contribu-
tion rate to hi .s une:raployment experience as indicated by bene-
fit payments to his former employees.. In most of' the states 
having a pooled fund, there is def.tn1 te, provision £or merit 
ratings on some basis or other. In a few states, the la. mere-
ly provides that a study shall be. made. as to the basis for 
possible marl t ra..ting. For example, the lassacbusetts law con-
tains the following: 
ttseotion 11 (a) The commission shall, in the 
year nineteen hundred and .forty, report to the 
general court all available data on the subject 
of' merit rating, reeonnnend.ing a plan or plana upon 
~hich contribution rates may be reduced in con-
formity With .sections nine hundred and nine and 
nine hundred and ten, or either of: said se·ct1ona, 
of' the Federal Social Secur1 ty Act, so called. 
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"(b) The commism on ahall investigate and 
report upon the approximate degree of unemploy-
ment hazard in the various industries, occupa-
tions, and employments showing an .excessive 
cost to the fUnd measures for stabilizing em-
ployment therein. It shall also, if it deems 
it necessary, recommend to the general court a 
higher rate of contribution for any classifica-
tion of industries, occupations or employments 
in which unemployment ia excessive or continuous." 
In one bill now before the legislature, it Is proposed that 
the report and recommendations with respect to merit rating 
be deferred until 1943.-. 
"The great advantage in the pooled fund, according to 
its advocates, is that it gives equal protection to all 
workers, inasmuch as it spreads the ri~ks of unemployment 
over a large group of employers and a wide variety of indus-
tries, thus utilizing the principle of insurance with the 
broadest possible spread of the risks. In the reserve-account 
system, on the other hand, the- reserve accounts of employers 
w1 th a high rate, o! lay-offs may at time8 be inadequate to 
provide benef'l ts to all their workers, while t'unds may be im-
mobilized in the reserve accounts of other employers not sub-
ject to such fluctuations in business. It is held that, s1nce 
the employees, and ot'ten the employer, are not responsible t'or 
such high rates of unemployment they should not be penalized. 
Under a pooled plan, the reserves are available to any em-
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ployee irrespective of his employer. ·" ( 1 ) 
Section 910 (c) of the Social Security .Act defi nes a 
pooled f'und .as f'ollows: 
"The term 'pooled :fund' means an tmemploy-
ment fund or any part thereof in which all con-
tributions are mingled and undivided, and from 
which compensation is payable to all indivi-
duals,. except that to ind1 vidual a l .ast employed 
by employers with respect to Whom reserve ac-
count-s are maintained by the State a gency, it 
i s payable only when .such accounts are ex.J:'>...au sted." 
Section 910 (a) provides that the taxpayer ahall be al-
lowe d the add! tional credit a gainst his f'edei""al tax referred 
to in Section 909 only if the lower contribution rate al-
lowe d him under a state law setting up a pooled fund i a per-
mitted on t he basis of not less than three years' experience 
i n payment of' benefits. 
The effect of' these provisions is to allow the em-
ployer a maximum credit of 90% of' his .federal tax whenever, 
t hrough a merit rating system under a pooled fund, his rate 
is reduced below 2.·7-) of his annual payroll. 
As explained in Chapter VI, the a dditional credit al.-
lowance is perm1 tted under an ernpl.oyer reserve sy stem only 
when the reduction is restricted to reserves showing a bal-
a nce of' at least 7il% of the employer's total payroll. A cor-
(1) Social Security· in America, Pp. 111 and 112. 
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responding limitation is placed upon merit ratin s under the 
various pool plans. However, the contr'ibution rates to be 
applied to employers hose "reserve" ratios, (found by divid-
ine the annual payroll by the di.f£erence between contribu-
tions received and bene-fits chargeable) exceed 7 . 5%, vary in 
the different states. For Colorado the reserve ratios and 
contribution rates are a .s follows: 
Reserve Ratio 
% 
o.o - 7.-4 
'7.5 - 9.9 
10.0 and over 
Contribution Rate 
% 
2.'7 
1.8 
.. 9 
The Connecticut law provides for the followine; : 
Reserve Ratio Contribution Rate 
~ ~ 
o.o - '7.4 2.7 
7.5 ... 9.9 2.5 
10.0 
- 12.4 2.0 
12.5 - 14.9 1.5 
15.0 - 17.4 1.0 
1'7.5 and over .o 
It will be noted that in Colorado an employer whose 
ratio wa s 17.5 would be required to contribute at a rate of 
9/lO)t ·the following year, whil$, an employer i n Connecticut 
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with the same exper.ience would be excused from contributing. ( l ) 
Since tbe equalizatio~ of costs of unemployment insur-
ance as between employers in different states was one of the 
main objectives of the framers of the Social Security Act, it 
will be realized that there is some danger that among relatively 
stable industries this purpose may be de.feated, to some ex-
tent, by differences in contribution rates under the "merit 
rating" plans of the various states . 
The California law perroi ts a reduction of t he rate of 
employer's contributions to a minlnrum of 1%, beginni.ng in 
1941, in accordance with the actual experience of the employer, 
on the basis of the relation between his own contributions and 
the benefits paid from the unemployment fund which was charge-
able to him. 
The following chart showing the affect of benefit pay-
ments on the employer's reserve under the California law, 
with accompanying table, is copied from Page 8047-2 of the 
Connnerce Clearing House , Inc., Unemployment Insurance Service 
and was apparently quoted from an article b y S·amuel Leask , Jr., 
Member of the California Unemployment Reserves Commission. 
(1) See "The Administration of Merit Rating under Pooled-
Fwld Laws." Charla s V. Kidd. Unofficial report pre-
pared by the Bureau of Research and Statistics of the 
Social Security Board. November 1938. 
Reserve 
:.I' 
/G, ooo 
$ 
/4,000 
12, 000 
/o, o oo 
8, 000 
0, ooo 
L'f,OOO 
Bene£ 
Beg 
2, 000 
0 v 
cc 
oo.ooo 
EFFECT ON EMPLOYER ' S RESERVE OF 
BEtiEFIT PAYMENTS 
1-
I 
I 
~ANY A. I Y-ANNUAl PAYRO ~ 1--- ---I L 
I v I L-L 
------
v 
/ I ___ 
--- --
L 
, 
---
---
. 
. 
~-~ 
lfo b jenei'it v .. ,. . . l ja.id . I . ~ 
--- -
. 
f Jl500 .1: ~nei'it1 d anm; ~l.lJC . . ~ .· 
v . . 
/ . . . 1$2500. benef'i ts . . . Paid t.nnua:U ~3. . ~ 
t Pa3 .... "'s .· --- ---~·- - ------ --n ~/ 
v 
' 
/ 
---
---
. 
. . 
. 
\. 
---
% 
Reserve 
l b 
If 
l evel of ~hast 
merit rate J..O% 
level of !rd 
12.. IDII!Irl t re:ta 1. 
level of 2nd 
10 m«i t rate 2 .Q% 
level of 1st 
8 ~rit rate 2.~ 
4 
2 
0 
Rate 9 . 9% l.B% 2. 7'f. hereafter 
19!6 1931 1938 1939 1940 1941 
Year 
1942 1 943 1944 
Statistical Section 
1945 
CompaQy "A" has an annual pay roll of $100. 000 from 1936 through 
1 945. Experience of this company is shown in the Chart above and table 
below, which indicates gr owth of the employer 's r eserve and t he effect 
thereon of benefit payments. The solid line shows the employer ' s rese~ 
i f no benefits are paid during the period. This line indicates that 1941 
the employer would be entitled to a 2 per cent rate because his reserve 
at the end of 1940 was over 10 per cent. It will be noted that the slop 
of this line gradually flattens out because of small er contribution pay-
ments. The dotted line represents experience of the Company if 1, 500 of 
bene.fi ts are paid annually beginning 1938. This line represents the dif-
fer ence between the amount paid in as contributions and the amount pai d 
out as bene.fita and chargeable against t his employer ' s account. The e~ 
ployer becomes eligible for merit rating in 1943, at which time his rate 
is 2. 5 per cent . In 1945 his rate •li ll be 2 per cent, which represents 
net saving o.f 26 per cent of his annual contribution rate. 
The broken line shows the accumulation of this same employer ' s 
r eserve i£ 2 ,500 in bene£its are paid his employees annually . By 1945 
his reserve would be sli~htly above 4 per cent , and therefore he ould 
continue to pay the maximum contribution rat e. 
(The above appears in an article on the "Purposes and Ef fec t 
of ~ erit Ratingn by Samuel Leask, Jr ., member of' t he Unemployment 
Reserves Commission of the State of Cali£ornia . ) 
EI'FECT m~ EMPLOYER's RESERVE OF BE!~EFIT PAYJ4EN'rs 
l I - , ~ .~ II ---~- -~-
1 1 General 
I ! Pq ,oontri- No Benefits paid $1,500 or benefit payment& 
Year · roll bution , annually be , 1988 
r-.te 
I 
I l I 
. I . . I i ' : I i ' j 
193& $100,000 .009 $900 0 ' #900 ----... $900 oi $900 ---- i $900 o ¢900 ·--- 1 
1931 100,000 .018 1,800 Oj 2,700 __ ...;.. 1 .800 Oi 2,700·- 1 1.,800 . 0 2,700 ;-- : 
I I . . . . I : I 1938 100,000 .021 2 .. 100 . o 5,400 ---- 2,100 o, s.soo- 1 2,100 o· 2;900 ---
. I I . I . ' 
'1939 100,000 .021 .2,100 0 , 8,100t-- 2,700 0 ; 5,100 :- ~ 2,100 o: 3,100 ·---- I 
·1940 1oo,ooo .021 2,100 ol 1o,aoo- ·z,1oo o : 6,.3oo '- 'I 2,100 o 3.30o-
'1941 . 100,000 ' .021 2,000 . 1 1ool u.aoo , .  2.o. . 2,100 o: 1,soo:- : :.1oo o 3,500 --
.1942 100,000 : .021 1,.500 11;200 14,300 i 1 ;..6 : 2,500 :%00 · 8,700 · 2.6 I 2;700 0 3,700 _..__ 
1943 100,000 · .021 · 1.,600 ,1,200 15,800: 1.s l- 2,500 zoo ·9,100 . 2.s l 2,100 o· 3,900 ----· 
19U : 100,000 .021 1,000 ! 1,100 ! 16,aoo ~ 1.0 2,000 100 ! 10,100 2.0 1 .2,.100 i o 4,100 ----
1946 100,.000 .027 1,000 !1,700 ,1 17,8.001 1.0 1 2,000 700 ·, U,200 2.0 i 2;'100 I 0 4,.300 .----
1 I ' I '• I 
f l j • I I i ; I. l . I 
• Where no merit rate is given. employer Is subject to the general contribUtion rate. ' 1 
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In the s-tates where def'ini te provision has been made 
in the state law for the determination of' merit rates the 
"reserve" :ratio is used as a basis. If' ''merit," in the sense 
of stability of' employment or progress toward stability were 
actually the basis for reduction, it would seem that other 
factors, such a .s separations, turnover , relative stability 
as compared with the employer's previous experience, or with 
the experience of other employers in the same industry , Should 
also be cons·idered. However , the data required for detennin-
1ng such factors are not currently available and would be ex-
pensive to assemble. Endless controversies would arise as 
to the determination of' such factors and the weight to be 
given them. 
The problem of industrial classification, for example, 
suggests any number of questions.. Groupings would have to be 
refined to an impractical deeree in order to render meticu-
lous justice to the individual employer. 
Board: 
As stated in a recent report of' the Social Security 
{1) 
"Use of the term 'merit rating ' implies a 
recognition of individual eff'ort or merit which 
is not achieved under any scheme yet found to 
be practically applicable. ·:~o J.<- * 
(1) See "Experience Rating under State Unemployment Com-
pensation Laws." Unoff'icial · report prepared by the Bureau 
of' Unemployment Compensation of the Social Security Board 
December· 8, 1938. 
-59-
nThis is not to condemn the whole idea o£ 
merit rating , but s 1Ir,ply to show that undue 
emphasis has been placed on the ef'£ect of' in-
centives tow,ard stabilization that do exist in 
t he present scheme s , vlhich in truth do not rate 
-nmeri ttt so much as "experience .. " A true mea-
sure of t meri t t ;oul d have t o t ake into account 
the possibilities. f'or regulariJ:ation inherent 
i n t he employer's. busine ss, a nd avoid. rati ng 
him on the basis of conditions over which he 
has no con trol . It ha s been suggeste d that em-
p loyers might be cla asif'ied by industry, thus 
a voidine t he unfairn e ss o£ app l y i ng the aama 
standards of' perf'ormance to all employers. 
Eo e ver, it i s :b.ighly questionabl e wl e t h.er any 
reasonable basis could be found for the classi-
f' i e a tion of' employers f'or ' meri t' rating pur-
poses. It is an unwarranted assumption that 
employers producing the same type of pro duet 
or of fering the same type of' service are sub -
j ected to similar unemployment risks. For ex -
ample, t he shoe manufacturer who make s or 
shoes has a rru.ch easie r task of regularization 
than one vlho manui'actures a line o£ sho·ea in 
.hich t he vicissitudes of .style tend to prevent 
regularization. lienee, any broad grouping fails. 
to produce a. norm a gainst which individual em-
ployers can fairly be rated. On t he other hand, 
if' i n dustry classi fications within a State, .are 
dra11'll so £ine as to 11m1 t each category to a 
group of employers engaged in the sa."'tle type of· 
business and coni'ronted 'With similar market con-
di tions., t he r e sult would be so close to no 
class:ti'ication at all that 1n ei'fec.t almost every 
employer ·Ould be treated separately. 
"A d if:ferent ·approach to the measurement of 
pure tmeri t t V«:~ul d be to grant rate reductions 
on t he basis of i mprovement shown after the i n -
ception of the rating plan. The obvious flaw 
in thia approach i .a that employers. 'Who have al-
ready carried out a euccewaf'ul program of sta-
bilization would be placed at a serious disad-
vantae;e as compared with employers who have as 
yet made no efforts toward stab ilization. 
,. 'Experience rating 1 t h e n :seems to be a more. 
descr iptive name for t he matter in hand than 
' meri t rating . r "lith thi s a pproach the s cheme 
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may more properly be regarded .as a method of 
~scessing responsibility f.'or unemployment at 
the most reasonable place~ i.e., aeainst the 
unemployed ir.dividual 1 s previ0us employers. 
It is less a measure of 'merit• than a measure 
of the cost of compensable unemployment attri-
butable to the employer•·a operations. It be-
comes immaterial whether the unemployment re-
sults from the employer'$ lack of £ore .sight and 
planning , or from the vicissitudes of the em-
ployer's ma.rke t; unemplo~m:tent occurs in either 
case and under an experience rating plan the 
cost of such unempl·oyment TJou1d be reflected in 
the employer's contribution rate. 
"Although the chief effect of experience. 
rating is to assess a larger share of tl::le social 
cost of unemployment against the unstable indus-
tries, the wide. va.riaticns in unemployment among 
employer:. in a single industry indicate that 
there remains a range vdthin which stabilization 
efforts may be effective.. Even though the rates 
for all employers uithin n glven industry may be 
!ugh, there may still be an incentive to stabili-
zation i.f a su.fficient nUI!lber of contribution 
classes is provided. A clothing manufacturer is 
in competition with other clothing manufacturers 
supplying the same market. If by his own efforts 
he can S:f)curo a more ;favorable ~ontribution rate 
than hla competitors* it is. to hi& advantaee to 
do so. He·nce in devising an ,experience rating 
plnn, the objee.ti ve. o:f e.ncouraging a desirable 
policy of' employment stabili,;ation ahould be kept 
in mind.• 
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Chapter IX 
MERIT RATING AlTD SEASONAL 1JNE PLOYMENT 
One of' the arguments advanced a gainst merit ratings in 
general is that in many casezs aeaeonal unemployment is beyond 
t he control of t he employer and that he Should therefore not 
be penalized by the assessment of a higher contribution rate 
than is applied to employers in other bus·iness not affected 
by seasonal variations. 
With respect to seasonal employment, thirty-five of 
the state laws -contain spe.cial provisions. That of ~a ssachu­
setts is typical. Section 21 of Massachusetts Unemployme n t 
Compensation Law provides as f'ollowa: 
"~~erever in any industry, emplo~nt ·or oc-
cupation, or branch ther.eof, because of 1 ts sea-
sonal nature, it is eus tomary to operate only dur-
ing a regularly recurring period or periods of' 
less than forty week s in length, and whenever 
there are individuals employed 1n such industry, 
employment or occupation who are not ordinarily 
employed during the year· in any other work , t he 
commission may, !'or the purposea ·ot thia chapter, 
ascertain,. and determine, or redeternrlne , after 
investigation, such seasonal per.iod· or period s 
for each such seasonal industry, employment or 
occupation, or branch thereof'. When t he connnis-
.sion h a s determined such seascnal period or · 
periods, it sha1.1 also .fix the right .to benefits 
and t he conditions required £or the payment of 
bene.fi ts to such individuals, and sl'.l&ll so modi-
fy t h e requirements for eligibility to benerits 
and t he conditi ons required for payment thereof 
that such individuals will receive benefits in 
reasonable proport~on to the length of time dur-
-62-
ing which t hey have been employed in such 1ndus-
t ry1 employment or occupation. For the purposes 
o:r this chapter, no i ndustry, employment or oc-
cupation or branch thereof shall be deemed sea-
s onal w1til the co~1is sion Shall l1nve ma de su ch 
a determination. " 
There are many variations among the .states as .to the number 
or weeks: r employment set as a standard.Maryland fixes t he 11m1 t 
at 20 week$, while Washington set.s it at 45 weeks. 
However, most of t he state laws have recognized that 
certain business have d efinite seasons of activity dependent 
upon conditi ons which they cannot control. OUtstanding ex-
amples are the canning and fiahing industries. 
Si nce many seasonal industries operate f'or shorter 
periods than twenty weeks they are left. outside the scope of 
t he state laws •11ch, ith few exceptions, speeif'y t hat the 
statutory raininrom number of employees (one" or t h ree, or four, 
or seven, or eight} must have been employed in at least twenty 
different weeks during the calendar year. For example., summer 
hotels are not subject to the r,aw wh e r e all employees work 
only from June 20th to Septemb er 12, or thereabouts, even if' 
during t hat period a large staff is steadily employed. 
Strangely enoug..h , t hE> Wisconsin law s pecifies, with 
respect t o t h e canni ng i ndu try that individuals employed in 
that industry are not elie ible for benefits during t he bu sy 
season, while other state laws speoif'y that individuals em-
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ployed by seasonal bussinesres shall not be E>ligible for bene-
fits during the "off" season. 
The Viiscons1.n plan would seem to be the more logical 
one, if it be as. umed that t he object of' taxing employers for 
unemployment insurance is to. place the cost of unemployment 
(or at least a portion of it) directly upon the induatry to 
which it :to related, instead of accepting it as a "community" 
cost as heretofore. 
Su spending the pe..yment of benefits for unemployment 
during the busy season .for the canning i ndustry might be de-
sirable if during ths.. t period there was a job for every worker, 
but suspendin benefits during the "o.f.f" season of a seasonal 
industry would merely relieve the employe,r o:f chal~ges a gainst 
his reserve or merit ra tlng account and so remove any incen-
tive to prolong the seas on or f'ind other ac ti vi ties to main-
tain employment in his eatablianment. If workers in the can-
ning industry, for example , are idle during the other months 
of' the ye~r, their losses due to unemployillent are a part of 
the cost of producing canned goods and should be so recognized. 
In nany industri-es 1 t is believed that seasonal unem-
ployment is more a matter of habit and tradition than of abso-
lute necessity. To the extent that this is true, merit rat-
---------- ~ 
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ings may assist in bring i ne to light methods ot overcoming 
such "ahut-downs." 
In Chapter X, various suggested meth-ods of stabiliz-
i.ng employment are discussed. Many of these are particularly 
applicable to the so-ca~led nseasonaln industries. llanuf·ac-
turers have not generally been so alert to the need. for avoid-
ing uneven distribution of employment an have merchants. 
Special sales during tradl tionally dull months, such as 
J anua.1•y , February and August, are planned with a view to main-
taining a faii•ly constant number of sales people at all times. 
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Chapter X 
STABILIZATION OF' EMPLO'YMEI~T 
That fltab111zation of e mployment i s an essential fea-
ture of n social $ecuri ty program wa:a indica ted in the 
Pr·esident '.s message to Congress WJ.ich accompanied the report 
of' the Committee on Economic Secu rity,. in Je.nuary 1935, when 
he said: 
"An unemployment compensation system .should 
be: constructed in such a way as to af':ford every 
practical aid and incentive toward the larger 
purpose: o:f unemployment atabilization." 
11 The term 'stabilization' is derived frorn the term 
'to s ta.bilize t or make stable. The term 's tabl·e t means that 
which is durable, not subject to sudden change, ab i d i ng or 
permanent. Mechanically spankin g it means a governor in 
which any small change of speed cause$ the parts: to move and 
reach a new position of equilibrium corresponding to the new 
speed. Applying this. def'ini tion to the term a .s u sed in des-
cribing employment it is evident that 'stable employment' is 
employment vtl.ich is constant or steady, which is not subject 
to sudden change, .fluctuation or disturbance despite changes 
in other factors a.ffec.ting employment. That 18, as applied 
to any particulB.J" establishment it means that all the employees 
are reasonably sure of' continuous employment, that there is no 
perlod in which large numbers of employees. are laid oi'f or 
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t aken on, no peak periods. of heavy employme.nt with correspond-
ing periods of increased unemployment ;tt {1) 
Th e rate adjustrnent devices found in the various State 
la ·;s f or encouraginc; r egular! ty of employment {or eli scourag-
i ne i rregularity) v.ere inserted to promote: 
a. continuous- employment. of the seme indivi-
. uo.ls over a given period of time (as in the case. 
of gunrnn teed employment plans) ; o~ 
b . such control over the labor turnover o.£ 
an establishment over a given period as will mini-
mize. t he 8J;llount of' benafl ts paid to former employees. 
Other "ways in which tho State agency c.ould accomplish 
thi·s would be to publ·ish studies of' the m.ethoda. utilized by 
employers _ to &tabilize employment; to encourage and assist in 
the adop tion of pr·actical me thods or ·· vocational training , re-
trainin0_, and vocational guidance; to 1n~est1ga.te, recommend, 
advise, and assist in the establishment and operation {by 
mun.lc1pal1ties, .counties, school districts, and the State) of 
reaer'Ves for public worke to be u sed in times -of business de-
pre~sion a nd unemployment; .and to these ends to employ experts 
and to ca.rry on and publis-h . the results ,o:f investigations and 
research studies." {2) 
{ 1) Unemployment Insuranc-e Service., 1939, Commerce Clearing 
House, Inc. Treatise .Par .. 1815,. P.805w 
(2) Social Security in America, P .. 130. 
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Stability of employment has long been recogni£ed as 
socially desirable and various plans had been devised by in-
dividual ·employers for regular1.z1ng emp1oyment long before 
the enactment of the Social Security Act .. 
In 1931, the United St.a.tes Department of Labor oade a 
survey o!' variotta unemploym.ent-benef'i t or unemployment-guaran-
tee plans then in existence.. Of these fifteen were private 
company plans, covering about 50,000 of their employees, guar-
anteeing the worker a. certain number of weeks' work in the 
year, or, in the event of a lay-off·, unemployment bene.fi ts 
for lost t 1."1le. 
Foremost among these was the Denn1$on Manu.facturing 
Company o.f Framingha..l1'! , .~1aesa.chusett$, whose ":plann was started 
in 1916 and became .effective for the payment of benefits in 
l1a:rch, 1920. Thl..s: Cm::~pany also demonstrated t he e.ffectiveness 
o-f a conce:rted effort to regularize production throu~out the 
year. Undez• the Dennison pl$I1, for· example, '!memployntent re-
lie.f for per>J:oanen t employees classed as without dependents 
amounted 50 per cen t of' the normal · eekly pay .for a 48-hour 
week, but not more than $18.00 nor l.ess than $8 .00 f.or the 
:reek, o.nd for an employee classed as with dependents, 70 per 
cent of the normal eekly pay, but not more than .;;.24. 00 nor 
less than ~8.00 for the week.. No waiting period was requi re.d. 
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There was .appm~ently n o stated limit to the duration of bene-
fits payable to s.uch permanent employees~ but, according to 
information regarding this Company's plan published in a re-
port 1 s .sued in 1.931 by the United S ta tea Department of Labor 
{Bulletin 544) • the ave.rage number of 1ndi vidua18 employed by 
the Company had shrunk betlreen 192'7 and 1931 by approximately 
one-third.. During the .same period, the unemployment reserve 
fund had shrunk .from $111,755*28 to $35,~32.47. The above-
mentioned report atate8, with reference to the situation ex-
isting 1n March,. 19311 
"As no extra payments have· been made to the 
. fund, 1 t i .a rapidly being exhau•ted as a result 
of the demands upon 1 t during the current de-
pression, and it has been necessary to make every 
effort to make the available money go as far as 
pos s1ble. The directors have agree-d however, 
that at the earliest possible moment they will 
begin to build up t he fuhd .• 
However, 1 t appears· that no di.ttbursements .from the .fund 
were made a.fter June 1, 1932, and that payments were suspended 
inde.flnitely in October 1932. (The .financ.ial atructure of' the 
Company was apparently reorgani zed in that year .. ) 
Relatively few of the other plana were able to with-
stand the 1mpaet o.f the depression years o.f the early '30's 
.and were, accordingly, el ther amended or abandoned. 
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As indicated in Chapter VII several 21tnte laws provide 
f'or special treatment of employers maintaining approved em-
ployment guara.11ty plana, and t he Social Security Act recog-
ni zes their desirability b y permitting additional credit al-
lowance• against the :federal tax with respect to reductions 
in t he guaranteeing employer's contribution rate after the 
statutory requirements have been met. 
While 1 t nruat be borne in mind that re&Uarization of 
employi!lent is not entirely within the control of the indivi-
dual employer, many concerns have demonstrated in the past few 
years that work ~ be distributed more regularly if' a real 
effort tows.rd thn t end is made. 
The following is quoted from a statement made by .'!.arion 
B. Folsom, Assl•tant Tre~sure:r of the Eastman Kodak Company 
and a member of the Advisory Council for the Committee on 
Economic Security, at the hearings on the Social Security Act: 
"In our own company we have made a study of' 
stabilization for the last 35 years. ~e have· a 
very great seasonal fluctuation in the sales o.f 
our product, and yet we have been able to pro-
duce our reduct at a stable rate o-f production. 
This gra,ph will indicate what we have done. This 
is starting in January at 4.% of the year's sales 
and reaches the peak of' 15% in July , and then it 
goe .s down to 2% in November , and this other line 
indicates the way we actually produce during the 
year. V e build up the stock in the spring and 
we sell it in the summer. This i .s roll t·ilm that 
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we sell in the summertime when the people are 
taking pictures. V'e have been developing this 
system over a period o£ 35 years. 
"There was one of' our plante, where we had not 
been able to do such a ood job o:f stabilization. 
They sai d it could not be done, and yet when that 
plant, on the 1st of January-, 19~3, started to 
pay bene.fi ts to the people who were laid of.f, and 
the record of the benefit went to the head office " 
to the pre·sident of the company, that plant wa.a 
v.ery much concerned about it. They started to do 
a better job. They called on our planning and 
stati s tical department and that department did 
everything it could to help them out. As a re-
sult, we have been able to do a better job in sta-
bilizing that plant . • . people mo say that noth-
ing can be done about stabilizing a1mply do not 
know What they are talking about. I am talking 
from practical ·experience."' 
Interesting also is the following quotation from th& 
testimony of ],r. Harold · ·• Story " Allis Chalmera J.!anuf'actur-
ing Co., be.fore the Senate Committee: 
"The incent1 ve to stabilize employment comes 
in the provision which says that you may scale 
down your contributions when your reserve reaches 
a certain level... Obviously, if you are paying 
benefits regularly to unemployment you will never 
have any res·erve, but there is a definite incen tive 
to produce steady e1nploymen t .for your people, and 
thus gain the benefit of the reduction .•.. 
"Let me poi nt out to you just the psychology 
of this 1ncenti ve that I speak of. The treasurer 
of a company, the guardian of the exchequer, has 
a keen eye for cash leaks in any company. When 
he sees an opportunity to cut down the cash leaks 
by payment of unemployment benefits which will oc-
cur, he is going to be very arbitrary ith both 
his .sales and manufacturing department to attempt 
to stop that leak. That is simply treasurer's 
psychology. 
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"We k:no that unemployment can, that emtlof-
ment can be steadied. Only experience canel 
us ho -niU'Ch, but in the very short time that our 
law has bee·n in operation, we have had tremendou s 
interest in the ma t ter of' stoady employraent ••• 
The Whole point 18 to have advertence o~ the em-
ployer w1 th the problem of steady employment. You 
must have that advertence, and you ill have it 
only tP~ough incentive." 
In its UnemploYlllent Insurance Service :for 1939, 
Commerce Clearing House, Inc. describes various methods o:f 
stabilizing :employment. Amon"" these are the f'ollo Yin _: 
1. Organization of employer e;roups with ar-
rangements for trans~erring orkers from one es-
tablishment to another as required during peak 
periods. 
2. Centralized emplo;rtn!n t contro.l so that 
transfers between departments may be made with 
a view to minimizin lay-offs. The trainin of 
employees for several operations ie also sug-
gee ted. 
3 . Greater care in selecting employees so 
that there may be more assurance of their being 
retained. 
4. Production planninr;. This is probably 
one of the most effective means of stabilizin 
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employment. This will usually 1nvol~ building 
up stock o r inventories, especially in cases 
whe re seasonal buying habits are firmly estab-
lisl:ed. 
5. Standa.rization of' products. In so f'ar 
as the standardization of' a product enables the 
manuf'acturer to build up his inventory without 
danger of loss through obsolescence, etc., it is 
in itself', an ai.d to stabilization of employment. 
6. Sales planning: The atimulat~on of de-
mand in "of!'" seasons will also b& helpf'ul in 
distributing productlqn more evenly throughout 
the year. 'r.he booking of orders several months 
ahead may be encouraged through the extension of' 
special discounts on such orders. 
The Service cort ain& further eu.ggestions to employer a 
as to me thods by which unemployment may be distributed a mong 
employees in .such man.."1er as to mini mi ze the amount of bene-
fits charged to the employer's account. Some of them ould 
be ~disadvantageous~ 2 covered worker.. The :following, 
:for instance: 
11A part-time basis of employment for all em-
ploye es during a slack period has aleo been sug-
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gas t ed as a method of spr~a.d.in to:> work during such 
periods a nd of' keeping employees on tl~e payroll. 
Such a ue th ou w.i ll enable the employer to keep 
his individual account from being charged with 
benefit payments eo long as sufficient time is 
given ea~h week whereby the employee may earn at 
l east 50?~ of h is average weekly wage or wvAtever 
the minimum requirement ia. tmder the State law. 
Fer example employees who normally earn over C30 
.a week must be entployed a suf£1cient time each 
week to ina.ure that they earn at least ~·~18 a week 
in thoae States which provide !'or :r;ertial bene-
.f1 t .s \'ihanever the employe& recei ve.a less t J:l..an six-
fifths of his weekly benefits, or $17 a week in 
those States which provide .for ;tartial benefits 
whenever the weekly waee !'alla below the total u..'l-
employment benef'i t plus $2. 
uAl tho ' h a..'1 en ployei• can tb.us 1.1a.intain hie 
reserve nccount at a constant level and lower 
his contribution rate or eliminate contribution 
payments altogether, such a policy o£ distribut-
ing work, i:f lone· continued, will not be bene-
ficial to either workers or· employers in the long 
run D.nd will be of a dvantage to the employer only 
in eases Where the slack period is temporary and 
unusual and \vhero it la o:r grea.t 1mp0l .. tance to 
maintain an undiminished force o:f mrkers for a 
later rush period.~ 
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CHAPTER XI 
METHODQ CF CDr-:1PUTD!G t:ERIT RAT 1NG3 
"ithin certain limits. the me thods of determining 
reductions i n employer ·contribution rates are left to the 
individual States. Ho.wever ~ since a reduction in rate re-
s ults 1n no saving to the employer-taxpayer unless 11 additional 
cre~di t '' against his tax payahle under Title I X of the Social 
Security Act is allowable with respect to the difference 
between the reduced r a te and the standard (or the highest) 
rate. it. is i mportant that the redUction be determined in 
(1 ) 
conform i ty with the pertinent provisions of that Act. 
So tar as reductione in rates of contribution to a 
pooled fund are concernedlJ. the Act merely requires that the 
reduction be based on not lesg than three years' charges 
against the em·ployer's merit rating account .. 
i'li th r espect to guaranteed .employment accOU!':ts • the 
Act specifie s that the guarantee must have been fulfilled in 
the preceding calendar year and the a .ccount must sho~ a bal-
ance of' not less than 7-i1! of the tota l wages payable for 
guaranteed employment during the preceding calendar year. 
The provisions with r espect to separate rese rve ac-
counts are also more definite: 
(l See Pp . 34 .. ·37,. supra .. 
-7.5-
1. Benefits must b,a ve bee n payable fr.om the 
account during the entire cal endar year preceding 
the reduction 1n rate; 
2. The balance of the account must.. be at least 
three times t he l argest amount of benefits charged 
thereto during any one of the three preceding cal-
·endar years. 
3. 'Th-e halanc.e of the account must a lso be at 
least 7~ of t h e to·tal payrol l for the preced ing 
calendar year, 
It will be noted t hat the fed e ral law does not prescribe., 
in the case of pooled tunda, any m·ethod of computing t he rates, 
n or ·, in t he ca se of separate reserve accoun ts, what p roportion 
ot the contributions received shall be cred ited to the account,. 
or what benefits s hall be charged against it .. 
In a l l the ~tates ope:rating under an employer reserve 
sys t em, and in all pooled fund s :t.ates where a d tini te 1. e thod 
of de termining nm erit." rates bas been prescribed in t he state 
law (see Appendix),. the reduction in contribution rates is re-
quired to be baaed (subject to limitations in certain s.ta t es) 
upon t he relation between the following t wo items: 
a. The excess of (1) all contributions receiT .d 
from the employ.er and . oredi ted t.o his account 
over (2) all bene·ti t s char geable against his 
account;. and 
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b. The average ann ual payroll. 
This relation is reterred to (tmder both the employer reserve 
s ystem and the pooled tund plan) as the nemployer reserve ratio. " 
\1h1le the d.fin1t1on of the "employer reserve ratio'' 
as indicated above is generally applicable to most of the 
stat ·es, there are so many possible and actual •ar1at1ons in the 
m~thod ot arriving at each .ot the factors entering into t he 
formula as to render-comparisons between the sta ~,.. es rather com-
p licated ~ Er..ch of the .factors is discussed below: 
Contri butions Credited to the Employer ·• a Account: In two 
states (Indiana .and South Dakota) five-sixths of the employ-
er's contributions are credited to his reserve ac count and one-
sixth to a ooled account' in Oregon, one-ha lf of 1 ~~ is pooled 
and all the rest is credited to the· 1nd1 vidual reserve; in 
lsconsin, the entire amount received 1a credited to the 
reserve. It will therefore· be seen that. even among the 
states operating u .der the reser~,e system, t here is wide 
f; 
·,;. !:' 
variation 1n this factor .. 
Simi lar differences exist among states where t here ia 
a pooled fund. In seventeen ot them,. all cont::1but1ons re-
c:ei -ved from the employer are credited to his mer-1 t rat.i g 
account; in seven more, all but 11o is so credited; one st.: te 
(Connecticut) credi tn fi ve-slxths- to t he lndi v i dual a ccount 
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,1) 
and another ( Michigan) credl ts tour-fifths . It is to 
be expeet.ed that o,ther Tarlat1ons will appear in the states 
where the method ot computation is yet to be de.fined .. 
It will be realized \hat e-ven Oil this factor alone 
two ;states having identical "merit ratlng" schedules might 
apply different rates t.o an emplo7er having the same unem-
ployment exper-ience in each State . 
Benefits Chargeable yaipst the Ellplorer • s Accoun\: The 
amount of benefits to be charged agd.nat. the employe.r's ac-
count also varies considerably under the laws of the differ-
ent ~tates .. 
In W1aconain1 und.er the reserve ayatem,. benet'l ts are 
first charged against the moat;. recent employer, and when a 
worker has drawn enough compenaa.tlon t.o wipe out hi.s beneti t 
cred1 t wi t .h the most recent employer .. any further beneti ts are 
charged against employers' reserve accounts in inverse chrono-. 
1 gi-eal order. A. similar method is fo l lowed in other "reserve 
s ystem" .states. 
In general, the prescribed mthods ot charging the em-
p loyer•a· merit rating account in ~tates having pooled funds 
may be ·summarized as follows: 
1 • Chars1ng the most recent emploJer w1 th all 
bene1'lts paid to an individual separated trom em-
ployment by him. (In some stat·es. the next. most 
(1} "The Administration ot Aut,oma t .1c Merit Rating U.Ylder 
Pooled Fund Laws." Charles V. K.idd. Unofficial report 
prepared by the Bureau ot Reeearch and Statistics ot 
f.he Social securi1.y Board. Noveaber, 1938. 
-78-
recent employer includes the previous employer 
also where the most recent employment has been 
or very abort duration.) 
2. Charging employers in inverse chrono-
logical order., to the extent o'f wage credits 
earned in their employment. 
3. Charging employers. simultaneously in 
ratio to benefit credits earned in their employ 
during the ,.base period••• 1 .. e-.. the period to 
be used as a basis !or determining the amount 
and duration ·of benefits. 
4 • . Charging the most ·recent employer in 
proportion to the wage credit,>· ·earned with him, 
but r4ot. attempting to charge preYious employers' 
accounts; any. excess being charged to a "general 
account .. " 
It has also been suggested recently that all benefits 
paid to an individual be charged to the account or his most 
recent employer during the -base period .. " 
The selection of one or anot.ljer of the above-·indicated 
methods will (or should) depend upon the theory hich the 
State adopts in dec:idlng whether the reapons1b111t.y for a given 
spell of unemployment attaches solely to the em_loyer from whom 
he was most recently separated or whether previous employers 
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sha r e t hat r os ponsibility . 
There i s le•a logic to t he choice that woul d char cre t he 
benefi.ts only a caln s t entployer s durine the "base period, " 
since t he termlna t ion da t e of tha t period nwy have preceded 
tr..e i ndivi dual's emplo·ymen t by t he most r e cent employer, i n 
whi ch cn ~e no char ge would e made again s t t he latter' s a c count. 
From an admini s trative vie ~point, merit _ratings pre sent 
i nnumerall l e diff iculties. Even if it is decided that onl y 
one i~ormer employe!' shall be chareed wl t h benef'i t s pa id to 
a n i ndividual ·during a given spell of unemployment, or &uring 
a gi ven benefi t year, the question as to the status of a 
tempornry employee Will ari se. Con.troversies with employers 
will he inevitable under any system, and t he more employers 
t here are to be charge d with respect to a e iven serie s of pa y-
ment s, the greater the adJninl strati ve problem. For example, 
if all former employers Within the 'base periodttare to .t. e 
charge·d, 1 t will be necessary for the state unemployment 
compensation a gency to send notices to all of them , and to 
conduct corre spondence w1 t h all . of t hem regarding dou tful 
cases . 
Freq1:1ently, t he most rec sn t employer is a "not-subject" 
employer or is exempt. In stat es where only the mos t recent 
employer is charged, no charge to any srnpl.oyer's merit rati ng 
account should be made for benefits paid to claimants separa ted 
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from "not-subject" employment. 
Average Annual Payroll: This factor is the least complicated 
of the three. Even here , however, the state laws express . t hei r 
individuality. In most s t a te s , this term means the average 
o£ the last three or t he la Rt f i ve years' payrolls, whichever 
average is the f:,;reater. But three states limit the basis to 
the last three years. 
\'Usconsin reports that contribution rates in t he .state 
for the year 1 9v9 will t,o up or down in several thousand cases . 
rrhe report of the ··isconsin Commission is reassuring : 
11 Under Wisconsin's law, each employer's separate 
acco~,t in the state fund is credited with all his 
contributions; and is charge d with all benefits paid 
his workers, based on past employment by him. Hi s 
contr·ibntion rate will go up or down in .future years, 
depen<,iing on the actual experience revealed by his 
account. 
"such a system of experience rating, while encour-
a ging each employer to employ his workers as steadily 
as he can, makes his contribution rate de~nd on his 
actual unemployment compensation record. Each em-
ployer's account automatically Shows the combined 
re sult of two factors, namely his inherent unempl oy-
ment hazard, and his own success or failure in sta-
bilizing ; so there is no need for complicated 'industry' 
classifications and rates. 
"Visconsin has demonstrated that such an experience 
ratine system, ·based on t he charging of benefits to 
employer accounts, is (a} entirely workable, and 
(b) iriexpensive to administer. An effective re-
ply can therefore be made to those who assert that 
any experience rating system is bound to be hopelessly 
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complicated and expensive, namely:--'Wisconsin is 
administering ita experience rating system both 
simply and cheaply;. ' " · . 
Nevertheless#' from the point of view of' admi nistration 
of' the state law, and especially from the viewpoint of a diilin-
istrati ~G costs, the sub ject of merit rating is of the utmost 
importance. Under a reserve system, no additional arlministra-
tive procedures and costs are required solely for merit rating 
purposes-... the employer's reserve account is also ·his l}lerit 
ra tine; account ... Under a poole d fund , benefits are payable 
to an eligi ble individual without regard to the status of his 
employer's contributions-benefits ratio. Accordingly, except 
for merit rating purposes, there, is no requirement, under a 
pooled fund , that benefit charges b e distributed among the 
individual employers~ 
In addition to the accounting work involved, it 
would seem that there would be, in any system contemplating the 
charging of other than the most r ecent emplc.yer , the neces sity 
ot' notifying prior employers of the impending charge. It may 
well be anticipated also that employers representing "border-
linen cases between -one mte and another would scrutinize their 
merit rating accounts carefully and would challenge the proprl-
ety of any doub tful item, with a :re.sul tant increase in admini -
strative costs in handling and adjusting such disputes . 
A variation oi' the employer-reserve ratio has been 
s:uggested which substitutes the amount o:f wage credits i'or 
benei'its paid a ·s a charge to the employerls account. It has 
been proposed that as soon as an unemployed individual draws 
his first compensation check 1n a benefit year, the entire 
amount o:f wages c:redi ted to his account in his "base period" 
be charged against the merit rating .aecount of his mo·st re-
cent employer. 
This method would be simple to apply from .an adminis-
tra tive standpoint, since there would be only one item to be 
charged for each individual in a given benefit year; it can 
hardly be justif'ied on other grounds, beca'\lse of the inequi-
ties mich would result from ita application, especially in 
cases. mere an emp1oyer Who keeps his employees steadily en-
gaged except for a brief' ab.ut•down once a year for inve·ntory 
purposes or as a break between seasooa. The following example 
will serve to illustrate the point: 
Asstnne that Employer A and Enployer B both have the 
same annual payroll, $160,.000. Employer A keepe his plant 
running steadily throughout t h e year and has no turnover. 
However) e ,ach July _the. plant 1 s cl.osed :for a three weeks ' period 
\vhen the inventory is taken, and the plant put in order for a 
new year's work. Since the plant is located in a State hav-
ing a two weeks' waiting period, all of his 100 employees draw 
one benef'it cheek. 
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Employe·r B , on the other hand, has the same annual pay-
roll but ha.s a high rate o£ turnover·. In the course o£ a 
year, he lets 20 men go and t h ey draw, on the average, ten 
be.nef'i t check s each be£o-re becomming re-employed. 
It will be seen that under t he proposed method Employer 
A's account would be charged with all wages earned during the 
base period by his entire force of lQO men. In other words, . 
t he ratio o:f wages charged to annual payroll ;rould be 1001..; (as-
suming a base period o£ one year).. On the other hand, Employer 
B ' s account would be charged w.tth the base wr~od earnings of 
only 20 men, notwithstanding that his separations ha d resulted 
in much greater unemployment and twice as lara. a charge t o 
t he fund. 
The use of merit ratings is not incompata le, •1 th the 
idea of' a pooled risk~ There would appear to be no good rea-
son why rates should not he ·adJus ted, even under a pooled 
f'und, to reflect the relative cost to the fund of t he indivi-
dual employer's unemployment experience, as determined by one 
of the bases described above in connection r.ith the reserve 
ratio. Even unde.r that me thod, howeyer, there will be many 
complications. 
Far g reater difficulties will arise if an attempt is 
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ma de to adj u st con tribu tion rates on the basis of' such items 
a s: 
1. the individual employer's record as con-
pared wi t h other establishmen ts in the same in-
dustry 
2. the individual employer 1·s record as com-
pared with his own record in prior years 
3. non-compensable separations. 
If' a &tate were to attempt to grou p employers by ndus-
try f'or the purpose of' arriving at an index to be used in mea-
5 1 ring the "merit" of' individlal employers within t he ind· s try, 
t he problem of' classification would become ptramount. ( l ) Em-
ployers ould \vish to be grouped for t hi s purpose 11th estab-
liShments showing higher costs to the f'tlnd in order t hat t h eir 
relative position within the group might be bet t er. Here 
again t h e 5tate a dministra tive .agency would have con troversies 
on its han&, expens ive to deal w1 th.. On t h e other hand , a 
comparison with a state-wide average for all employers uld 
result in an "experience" rating in whi ch dif'ferences i n em-
ployment condi tiona as between industries could not be taken 
into account. 
If "meritn is to be i n terpreted as meaning progress 
toward stabilization, then any scheme which attempts to take 
(1) See quotation from "Experi ence Ratings unc~r State 
lJnernploym.ent Compensation La.vts" , December 8,1938, 
appearing at Pp . 58 --60 
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merit into a.ccount must give some consideration to that fac-
tor. But this factor also pre,sents situations not easy to 
deal with. What of the progressive ·establishment or indus-
try which bad already done much to improve its employment 
conditions and tbaBeby diminished the rate at Which it could 
hope to improve in the futurecl .Shall it be penal i zed in f'avor 
of the type of employer wh.o shows greater L'llprovemen t prin-
cipally because his employment condi t~ions were poor at the 
outset? On the other hand, should not some 1ncent1 ve be of-
fered to employers whose business i .s· such that they cannot 
hope to achieve the degree of stability attained without ef-
f'ort by banks, public utility companies a.'Yld t he like? 
It has been argued .also that .all separations and ac-
-
cessions should be used a.s a me.asur,e of merit, rather than the 
compensable separations whiCh result in payment.s from the fund. 
The proponents of this theory assert, reasonably enough, that 
any scheme which .fails to consider non-eompensable separations 
i gnores an item .of' vital importance in any real measurement 
of employment experience. ., oreo.ver, if non-compensable separa-
tions are ignored, there will be a tendency for employers en-
gaging add1 tional employe·es .for work o.f temporary or uncertain 
duration to .select applicants without substantial benefit 
rights in order to minimize the amount of compensation charge-
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a ble against their merit rating accotints upon a subsequent 
release of such emp~oyees. fl1ere compensable separations 
/ 
/ 
are the only basis of d.eterm.ining merit rates, emplo-fers may 
be expected to spread unemployment amone employees with a 
view to having as many o:f · t hem as po&si ble serve a \7a1 ting 
period without ·COmpleting a compensable week. 
It should not be assumed., however • that even so s i:m-
ple an index as separations would not present complicated 
administrative problems. 
to de.fine a separation .. 
For example~ it woulGl be necessary 
When would a temporary lay-off 
? become a separation ~ Or must all separations not knovm in 
advance to be of less than one week's duration be reported by 
the employer. with some arrangement. for reducing the total 
by the number of individuals resuming work within a stated 
period? 
Another m~thod or min1mizing separations without a c-
tually improving. employment condi t i ons would be the spreading 
of a reduced number of hours per .week over a gr~ater number 
of individuals. (This has already been suggested to em-
players as an alternative means of obtaining reduced rates 
under the present rner1t rating schemes . I t oulcl ' e possible 
to reduce employment by one-half (even in those states where 
partial benerits are paid} without incurring any charges a gainst 
the empl.oyer' s account. Even under a guaranteed employment 
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plan,. as defined in the Social Security Act, the statute is 
complied i th if an individual gets as many as 'ttrenty hours 
a week 1n fifty weeks.) tabilizing at a low level would not· 
result i n any improvement in employment conditions from the 
orker's point of view, which is, after all , t he object of 
all stabilizing measures. 
Tne further problem would arise of veri fying independ-
ently information submitted by theemployer with respect to 
separations. So far as compensable separations are concerned, 
the state administrative agency is in a position to compute 
t he · runo"tL~ts to be charged on the ba.sis o.f i t .s own re.cords o.f 
benefit payments. If an index based upon ~ separa ti ens were 
to be used i nstead ,. . it is possible that the field force em-
ployed to verify other· information submitted by the employer 
woul d have to check this i tem also. 
It is to be expected that the studies now being aa de 
ith respect to di f ferentiat i on in contribution rates for t he 
purpose of stabil i zing emplo~~en t will result in f urther dari-
fica tion c.,f aims and methods. 
At present, t he trand seems to be away from a strict 
"merit" scheme, becnuse of' the complexity of t he problems of 
measuring a nd r a t ing "merit ," and to ard an adjustment of 
rates baaed largely on the relation of t he co.st of charged un-
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employment, as rapr&se.nted by benefit payments,. t he totn.l con -
tributions received from the e:nployer, and t he average annual 
payroll. 
Immediate legialntion on mer i t ratings is t.u-ged by 
.four members of the New York Stat& Advisory Council in its 
rece·nt report: 
:nit is both sound and &qui table that tho 
l ·evy upon the ·employer ,ahould be· a.djustod in 
proportion to his success in .furnishing steady 
work fo.r his employees.. This is a principle sim-
ilar to that used 1n many forms of insurance 
Which vary the rate in aecordanee with the risk. 
It is unfair to continue to tax all employers 
at the same rate in view of the grea.t differences 
in the amount of unempl.oymEtnt resulting from the 
·operatl.ons of' individual establishments. 
"How wide is the variation appe•rs .from e.. 
study made at the request of' the Council by the 
Bureau of Research and Statistics o:f the Division 
of Placement and tJnemploymen t Insurance. This 
~tudy shows that the total of' unemployment insur-
ance benefits pal d to vmrkers in the street, 
suburban and interurban traneportation industry 
from: April 1 to December l, 1938 amounted to 
only ?·'% of the contributions paid by employers 
in that industry during the base year 1937 . On 
the other hand, benefits paid to employees in 
the l'l'llnufacturing. fur industry amount.ed to 1837~ 
of the contributions paid in by employers in 
that industry. T11e same study shows that bene-
fits paid out to employEHils in the printing, 
newspaper a nd periodical enterprises were only 
16% of the contributions made by the employers, 
while employee a in the women 1 s coat.e, S'..li ts and 
skirts industry received benefits equal to 175% 
o:f the contributions paid by the employers in 
that industry. Likewise, benei'i ts considerably 
below the total a mount of contributions paid in 
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were paid out to employees in public utilities, 
restaurants, paper box manufacture, bakeries 
and many other industri-a s. 
"It is not r1r~1t to tax the owners of enter-
pri-ses whJ.ch are providing $teady year-round 
't'JOrk f'or alJ. or ~lOst of' t1:eir o. ployeea in ordor 
to furnish benefits .for those engaged in indus-
tries which have made little progress in supply-
ing regular work. If' certain industries cannot 
reduce the wide fluctuations in employment they 
should be asked to pay a somewhat higher r te 
of contribution than those mo have stabilized, 
even if this is reflected in 1:-.J.gher prices to 
the purchasers of the products or services o:f 
such industries. 
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Chapter cr:I 
P03 IBILrfi OF nor-m IFOR I 1Y OF PLO _..:~ COSTS 
A..J011G STATES miD · - VARIED MERIT RATn!G PLAnS 
.eterence -· de ·aa:rl.ler in thia report to the do:n-
ecr that the application ~f d1f~orent nerit r.at1n~ scheoea 
by t he various atatea 110uld upll&t tho uniform! ty of employer 
eoata w1 thout -which tbo :federal-state plan for unemploJ111Bnt 
insurance could net have been e&tabl1ebed. 
~le it ia the avowed purno e or the federal adrn1n1a-
trnt1on to leave to the initiative of the individual atate.s. 
t he· po·l1e1ea to be· follo ed. in conneet!on th various as-
pects ot unemployt!lent inlml'ance, there 1·s ,atrong reason !'or 
close federal scrutiny or an;r new m&r1t i;-at1ng ncb es that 
may be ropo.sed or :any- t:UUen·dmonta that t1a7. b& aucse te in 
existing plana .• 
The first test. to· be· applied to any merit· or experience 
rating s.ehene la ita :not · :t.fect on the aolvency of tl · st to 
fund . I t would 'be d1aaetrous to the aoci&l. security program 
if ny .... tate mould :find 1tsel.f unable to . eet ia obl1 tt.on 
to pay benef1 ta to the .full a:mount provided for 1n the ta ta 
la .. 
From a study of t: .. o p0l"t1nont provisions of the ~oc1al 
ecur1ty Act (Sec. 909) 1t ou1d appear that ao long as t here, 
i.e one employer in a given state who pays contributions at a 
-
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rate of 2.7% (or more) of his annual payroll all employers 
within that state paying lese than that rate· because of merit 
rating mo.y nevertheless obtain credit. against the federal tax 
(and accordingly a reduction of .operating coats) for the di.f-
f'erence between such lower rate and 2.7%. 
The item of' "contributions to state unemployment funds" 
may be relatively insignificant in conne:etion with commodities 
in which labor represents a small proportion of t he cost, but 
1 t i 8 of' considerable importance in the :manufacturing indus-
tires, such as textiles. such industries are affected by vari-
ation• in costs as between states and have been known to move 
f'rom one section of' the country to another in order to take 
a dvantage of' lower labor co.s ts. 
The e.ff'ect o:f transferring a large. operating unit t ·rom · 
one section of the country to another is tragic so far as the 
former employees left behind are concerne·d. Often the migra-
tion o.f a plant leaves a whole community de8titute of any 
prospect of "earning 1 ts living" w1 th the .skills 1 t had ac-
quired ov.er a period of years in serving the departed employer. 
The former employees will not only draw on the unanployment 
fund to tbe maximwn extent of their bene.fi t .rightB.--many of' 
them must subsequently be supported "on relie.f." 
--- ---
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The same considerations vbich prompted employers to 
protest a ainst unemployment insurance leE;islatlon in their 
own states prior to 1935 aa placing them at a disadvanta e in 
competing with employers in other sta tee will now impel them 
to seek merit ratings comparable with those in e.ffect in 
their competitors' states and lower rates llhen possible. 
Where a choice exists between reducing contribution rates and 
increasing beneflt rates or ID4linta1ning them at a high level, 
or perhaps paying benefits for longer period, it is natural 
to expect that employers will seek lower rates, especially 1r 
lowe1~ ro.tes have been established in compe·ti tors' Sta tea. It 
may be e.xp¥cted tbat labor interests, on the other hand,. ·rill 
tlish to see benefl t rights increased whenever possible . 
It might be argued that the difference in costa rep-
resented by reductions in contribution rates could hnrdlwr e 
important enough to bring about a. decision on the part of' an 
employer to move his plant to another section of the country. 
However, it often happens that theprospective location already 
of'fers other reductions in cos.t and the added item might then 
tip the scales in .favor o.f a decision to migrate . 
Even though t~e l ocal employer doe s not find it advis-
able to Je uve the state in the face oi' relatively higher 
costs, he is at a disadvm1tage in bidding a gainst the out-of-
-93-
ata.te manufacturer und~r such circUI!lstances and nulY lose orders 
mich would have ke t his plant going. 
It will be realized the re.fore that in order to prevent 
unemployment compensation contributions r.rom becoming a source 
of competi tion bet oen states, there must be careful over-
sight oy the f'eder.al government of any merit rating schemes 
t hat may be evolved. 
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Cbapter XIII 
OTHER PLANS FOR REDUCING EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTIONS 
The actuaries who worl<..ed out the 8Chedule of employer 
contribution rates reooramended by the Social Security Board 
greed upon the following: 
For· the y~ar 1936 .9% of the total payroll 
" ff ff 193 7 l • a% 11 n n " 
" " 
1.938 2.7p n 
" 
These rates appear in the varioua state laws .. 
It l$ urged that 2.7% should b& collected on the total 
5tate payroll each year in order to ensure the solvency of 
the fund, and that any merit ratings e .atablished should re-
sult in that amo1mt being collected in the aggregate, some em-
ployers contributing at less than 2.7% and other.a at a higher 
rate. 
Until .states have been paying benefits for more than 
one year, it would seem that no reduction in average rate 
should be considered. However, the pooled fund merit rating 
plans do not become eff.ecti ve until 1 941 and by then three 
years' experience should be available as a basis for determin-
ing contribution rates. 
It is suggested that in a state mere the balance in 
the Fund seems large as compared with one year t s experience 
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in benefit payments consideration be given to the .follovring 
que.st1ons: 
1 .. Is the reserve a.lilple to take care o.f 
any liability to covered individuals, on the 
basis of their accumulated benefit credits, 
which may result .from unemployment likely to 
be sustained during the period when such cre-
dits are available'? 
2. If so, ahould the state broaden ita 
bene.fit provisions to establish a higher bene-
fit rate, or a longer max~ duration, or both? 
In states where partial benefits have not been 
provided for, their adopt ion should be considered. 
Especially if the reserve has been built up, in 
part, by employee contributions there is sound 
logic to the argument that bene.f1ta be increased. 
3. I:f the •tate is already on a parity with, 
or in a bette-r posi t1on than, other States ·in 
the matter o:f -amount and duration oi' benefits 
would 1 t be advisable to reduce the to tal amount 
collected from employers in order to prevent the 
accumulation of' an excess! ve reserve a.t tho ex-
penee o:f such employers? 
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Proponents of strict erit rating plans do not ar e 
that merit rates be applied in such a way as necessarily to 
affect the total amount collected. Until rec~ntly , it has 
been assumed th_a.t such total would represent 2.7'f., of the an-
nual payroll. 
IIowe·ver, there are now before both the r assachuset ts 
and the 1:Ie York legislatures , proposals sponsored by employer 
group s whi Ch would adjust the total yield for a Biven year to 
the amount paid out in 'tho previous year. This plan is des-
cribed as follows in the recent report of the Unemployment 
Insurance State Advisory Council: 
"This nevtly proposed plan. called a •replen-
ishment• system, uses two factors: first, the 
individual employer's .experience i'ac tor deter-
mined by the ratio of the total wages received 
by those of his employe e s who drew benefi te to 
his total taxable payroll during the precedine; 
year; second, the statewide average rela tion of 
total. benefits paid out to the total wages of" 
all cia1mants who received benefits (this is 
taken as a :measure of the average durati on of 
compensable unemployment. ) By the use of the .so 
two fa·ctors a. contribution rate can be detern ned 
for each individual employer va:r.r1ng bet 1een a 
fixed minimum and maximum. A maximum rate :t s eet 
so that tl'e burden may not become too great f'or 
any employer , pa.rticularly those who have a great 
deal of irregularity due to irrcgula~ bus~ness 
conditions. The minimum rate which every employer, 
even those who ight have perfect stability of em-
ployment, will have to pay is a recognition of the 
social principle that all industries should help 
meet the cost of' benefits paid to employees in the 
less stable occupations. It is recommended that 
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the minimum be .fixed at ,one per .cent (as now 
provided in the present law) and the mnximun at 
three and one half per cent. The individual 
contribution rates will be determined annually 
based on the moat r ecent experience and will 
remain in effect :for an entire year. Thus, em-
ployers will have before them constantly the 
p os ,s:tbility of' achi~v1ne; a lower rate b y f't'tl'-
nishing more regular employment. Even those em-
ployers \1110 are confronted with marke d insta-
bility are apt to have, periods of sustained :full-
time employment with t h e resultant opportu..."li ty 
for improvine; their reccrds and makin · a saving 
in contributions . 
lfThi s .. roposed pla n has boen des:i{7led to 
contribute to the Fund at all times approxi-
mately t he sums paid out b..,. way of benefits so 
that the reserve in t h e Fund will be maintained 
constant at nny desired level. 
"The newly proposed plan described in the pre-
ceding point is much simpler to administer than 
any other merit or experience rating .plan now in 
operation or enacted (except the State of Texas 
which within the past two months has enacted sub-
stantially this pl~"l) . Under the provisions o£ 
t he Federal Social Security Act, actual modifi.ca-
tion of c.ontrlbutiona under a me1 .. 1 t or experience 
rating plan 1n a pooled £and 1a cannot becomo 
effective until 1941. By that time, such minimum 
records as are calJ.ed for by t l1e proposed plan 
ill be completely available ~thout complication 
and little administrative burden . 
"Mer·. t or experience ratint1" is primarily a 
financial measure. It merely detennines the di s -
tribution among er.:~ployers of the amount required 
to finance the benefit disbursements. Since the 
proposal contemplates o. poole.d fund, it can have 
no e·ffect whatsoever on benefit payments to indi-
vidual claimants, neither can' it have any effect 
on the total benefit payments. The incre·ase or 
decrease in the rates of' contribution will result 
in gr e ater stabilization of empl oyment to the bene-
fit of labor. 
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"Under the proposed plan which has been des-
cribed, the maxLmum Sta te· contribution rate ~ould 
be fixed at 3~ as against the present maximum 
under the existing la: of 3·:.~ . By reason of credi ts 
allowed under the Federal Law, the r e ·r York net · 
-contribution presently amounts to 2.7%. The total 
net increa se a pplicable to any employer, therefore, 
under the proposed plan cannot exceed 8/IOths of 1; ~ 
"'I'he proposed pl an cal.la for· basing t h e · con-
tribution rates upon three yeara' experience and 
will result primarily in producing the largest 
revenue in the better years, without placing the 
financial burden on employers in years of depres-
sion which might result if only a single year's 
experience were used. 
nThe recommendation for experience rating ~ith 
variabl.e contribution rates com.rnencing in 1941 is 
coupled with t he recommendation that on or before 
January 1 , 1941, bene.fi ta should be p rovide d for 
partial unemployment. · 1hese benefits will ound 
out the program of · protec tion to employoes a n d ·ill 
prevent employer~ f rom spr<:~ading the OI'1~ to an ex-
cessive degree. 
It should be noted that the Cotmc'il was not unanJ.mou.s 
in recommending the above plan . The labor representatives 
and the chairman urged that study of the question be con s idered 
for at least one year before a decision on revising t he tax 
rate was made. 
A similar plan i.s set forth in a. bill now bei'ore the 
A' assa.chusetts legislature, proposing to amend Chap ter l51A 
(House bill 1641). 
Another suggestion recently made, which has no connec-
tion with merit r atings, is tlmt the contribution rate, appli-
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cable to all employers alike, be reduced .from 2. 7% to 1. 7d 
when and if the reserve f\md shall have accumulated two and 
one-quarter times the amount distributed in b~nefits. in the 
year 1938 or any subsequent year in Whi ch the ~tal amount 
distributed is greater. The new rata. o~ 1.7% · ou1d continue 
un ti 1 the reserve f\md was depleted to three .... quarters of the 
ma.ximUlil limit. In order for this plan to e.ffect ~y saving 
to an individual employer, however, amendment of the Social 
SeCLtri ty Act (Sec. 909 (a)) would be required, since under 
that Act as it now stands the only e.ffect of diminishing the 
amount paid into the state fund under the above plan would be 
to increase the amount paid to tho federal government unde-r 
Ti tle IX. It is reported that Congress has been asked to make 
such changes in Section 909 (a) •a will permit an actual sav-
ing to employers under this plan. 
After due consideration has been given to the question 
of increasing benef'it ratea ancl benefit duration and ( here 
it docs not already exist) the establisb:me.nt o.r· .a system of 
benefits for partial unemployment, there would seem to be ur-
gent reason f'or .adjusting the reserve in the .fund to a figure 
bearing a reasonable relation to the maximum antount which may 
have to be paid out in bene.fits in a given year, havine; in 
;mind that the system does not attempt to cover prolonged un-
employment in a major depression . 
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To collect contributions beyond that point is to burden 
employers unduly, and. their tax burdens are already heavy. 
The employer' a burden could also be eased by the elim-
ination of differences. between the requi rem.ents for returning 
information under Title ~ VIII and Tit~ IX of the Social 
Security Act and the standardization of state requirements 
vii th respect to reports to unemployment compensation agencies. 
Many of the dif:ferences between state laws could and should 
be eliminated. Vv'hei'e an employer has employees in more than 
one state--and some large employers have employees in twenty 
states or more--the variety or :records and returns is appalling 
and the cost of preparing them is a matter Which arouses in-
dignation even among employers ~10 firmly believe in the aims 
of the social security p~ogram. 
-101-
Chapter XIV. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In connection with :merit ratings \Ulder unemployment 
compensation laws, three major questions present themseives: 
1. Can employment be stabilized? 
2. 'Vill merit ratings have the· effect of 
stabilizing employment? 
3. Should other methods of stabilizing 
employment be sought? 
As to the first question, the answer is "It has been 
done. The practice :t s spreading . n Ample evidence that much 
can be accomplished. by the individual employers is found in 
the records of such companies as the Dennison anui'acturing 
Company, the Eastman Kodak Company and many other leaders in 
guaranteed employment plans preceding the enactment of the 
Social Security Act. This is also indicated in the testimony 
of employers and employees in Wisconein a.fter that State had 
been paying bene.fits for about a year. 
As to the second question, the answer aleo appears to 
be in the affirma tive. If employers have been influenced to 
~tabilize their employment under the employer reserve system 
in Wisconsin because . of the prospecti;ve saving in contribu-
tiona , it may well be assumed that a similar motive will 
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exist under the merit rating provisions of the pooled .fund 
laws and under employer reserve systems in other states. 
In this connecti on, Stephen i.! . Dubrul said , at a maet-
i n g of t he American Statistical Association, in December, 
1 936 , 
* * *"Pro.fessor Bigge expressed a belief' that merit 
rating is too complicated to become practical 
because of the statistical work involved and, 
furthermore, expressed a belief that it ill 
.fail of ita purpose now to furnish an incentive 
for employers to do what they can to stabilize 
employment. I strongly dissent with this posi-
tion. In the first place it is possible to set 
up merit-rating systems so that they are simple 
from a statistical point of view. In the ·-ichigan 
Law, we have eliminated most of the complications 
in merit rating by providing that an employee's 
benefits shallbe charged back against the account 
of the last employer, thus eliminating charge-
backs to prior employers. This is sound in prin-
ciple because once an employee has left the em-
ployment of a given employer and has obtalned an 
employment with another employer, there is no rea-
son why the merit rating of his prior employer 
should be aff'ected one way or another by subse-
quent unemployment. I n the second place the only 
defini tion for payroll taxe·s basically is to make 
the co.st of' unemployment compensation an indus-
trial coat and there.fore a part of the price sys-
tem so that t he price of the product will consist 
of varying charges depending upon the unemployment 
experience o:f the firm or industry manufacturing 
that product. The price o~ automobiles and houses 
must contain sufficient element of such costa .for 
unemplo:rment compensation purposes so that the 
public, villose buying habits produced the wide 
cyclical :fluctuations in these industries will pay 
for the burden mich this places upon the community. 
On no other basis can payroll taxes be justified. 
If the contrary view is taken that nothing can be 
done about t he problem of' unemployment (in spite of 
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the fac·t that many concerns and industries have 
shown that a lot can be done about it) and thus 
that unemployment-ri ai~ply a residual social 
cost, then under no circumstances are payroll 
taxes justified for f inancing unemployment relief 
but on the contrary such relief .should be financed 
solely by graduated individual income taxation. 
Wi thout merit r ating t herefore, the mole theory 
of payroll taxes to support unemployment compen-
sation breaks down. Merit rating grants no favor 
to any employer. It simply provides that the 
taxes will be somewhat in proportion to the risk 
exactly in the same way as is done in determlning 
fire insurance rates by cities and types of dwell-
ings. 
" V:ri th merit rating si"1plified statistically, 
there remains no reason why it cannot be made ef-
fective to f'urnish strong inducement to the i ndi-
vidual employer to do his best to i mprove the un-
employment experience of hi s own employees." 
l_ore i mportant perhaps than the questior.: of saving in 
cost is t he fact that employers in general may be expected to 
become i'stab111zation-conscious11 so that the ppse of their 
business will receive attention not hitherto accorded it. 
Just as workmen's compensation laws have resulted in a cons-
claus effort to minimize industrial accidents, with all the 
badges, posters, and awards i nciden t to a "campaign," it may 
be hoped tbat nnder unemployment ·Compensation laws, employing 
establishments will give heed to the effects of their employ-
ment policies (or laek o:f them) upon the welf'are o:f the indi-
viduals Who work for them. 
However much individual employers may try to stabilize 
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employment within their om. establishments, the larger prob-
lems connecte d »lth stabilization cannot be solved ~thout 
group action, or governnent intervention, or probably both. 
This is true if the term "stabilization of' entployment 11 is to 
b e interpreted as meaning the regular employment of all em-
ployable indi viduttls . 
The "~ .P.A .. " is, of course, an e:x:araple of a govern-
mental effort to provide employmen t for employable a 'tk.1.om pri-
vate emploYI11ent cannot use. ,'[any advocate tr.e permanent adop-
tion of a flexible program of well-:planned public works pro-
jects to be put into operation a s needed VIhenever the index 
of private employment falls below an established minimum set 
a s the si e;nal for such a.ction. 
It 'WOUld seem that in adu.ition to providine; employment 
direct, t h e governnent mi ght be able to assi~t business in 
:fostering plans .for stabilizing e r,1ployment . There are always 
t h e persuasive taxing provisions to be employed when necessary 
to bring about acti.on desirable .from a social viewpoint but 
not always equally desirable from the taxpayer's standpoint 
without the incentive provided by the tax. 
' ihen literally millions of' workers in a country like 
the United States are unable to find regular employment for 
1hich they are reasonably fitted, the situation should chal-
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lenge tho attention not only of t he government itself', but 
a lso of' those econorni ~ ts, industrialists, and labor· leaders 
whos e best inte.rests are associated with a survival of the 
existing economic order. Employment can hardly be said to 
have been ''stabilized" until these millions nre regularly em-
ployed . 
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THE MERIT RATING APPENDIX 
CONTRIBUTION RATES UNDER MERIT SYSTEMS 
(Aa of June I, 1938) 
Rates-Rat los: 8a lance to Payrolls 
STATE TYPE FUND Under 7!• 1o- 12!- 15- Over 
7}% 10% 12}% 15~ 17~ 17!~ 
Alabama 10 Pooled 2 -7 TO be set by commission. 
Arizona 8 22 a3 Pooled 2 7 2.0 1-0 1.0 1.0 1 .0 =1-3 
p:l C/.l P' Arltansas 8 11 22 Pooled 2 -7 2-0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1. 0 ::s 0 1-'• 
1-'- Q(Il california 31 32 Pooled 2 7 (See footnote 27 . 0) 
<D 1-'• 
colorado t~ 14 33 Pooled 2 . 7 1 8 o.s 0 9 0 9 0 -9 1--'Sl:lc+ 
1-'Sl:l connecticut 23 Pooled 2 7 2 . 5 2-0 1 . fi 1.0 zero :X:. a' 34 
3-0 (commission to set rate ror each . (fi t-' District or columbia Pooled (!)0 employer . ) 
:;C.: () 11 Pooled 2.7 1.8 o. 9 ?.ero zero zero !-'-~~ Delaware 
I....J 1-j ::S Florida 8 Pooled 2-7 2.0 1 . 0 1.0 1.0 1 .0 () 1-'• p. 
Oc+ Georgia Pooled 2 . 7 (Merit SYstem to be studied) ~ <.q I"' Pooled 2 .7 2 7 1 8 0 -9 zero zero ... () Idaho 31 f-3() Illinois II 33 Pooled 2 7 1.8 0-9 zero zero zero P' O 
Indiana 14 21 23 31 2 -0 1 2 -0 1 1 0 2 1-02 3 .. {j >< 5/6 :!: R. 1/8 Pooled 2 7 zero 1-j~"d Iowa 33 Pooled 2 -7 1 8 0·9 0 9 :).9 0 9 <D c+ Ill ::s 1-'•::::S Kansas 10 33 Pooled 2 7 1 . 8 0 9 0-9 0 9 0 9 c+ o<.q 
!-'> ::s 1-'• KentucK.y 24 5/8 E R. 1/6 Pooled 2 7 (see footnote 28. ) () ::s Louisiana 33 Pooled 2 .7 1.8 0 -9 0 -9 0 -9 o.g <D§(J:) 
. I Maine Pooled 2.7 (Merit system to be studied) ~ p,.l-+-
Ill 0 Maryland Pooled 2 .7 (No provision ror merit system) 1-'::0 0 
Pooled 2 7 (Merit system to be stUdied) 1-' c+ Massachusetts 
"' 
o::::s ~l ichigan 11 2a 80% E R 20% Pooled 3 . 0 2-54 2 0 5 1 56 1 0 7 1.07 0 
Ht-j T Mlnnesor.a 10 12 31 Pooled 2 7 1.8 1 3 0 -9 0-9 0-9 ::s p. a> Mississippi EmPloyer Reserve 2.7 (Merit system to be stUdied) 0 (ll t 'l 
"' 
Missouri 33 Pooled 2 -7 1.6 o.g 0 -9 zero zero : 1-j 
1--' Montana Pooled 
.2.7 (see footnote 29 . ) 
•) 
,J Ne braska Employer Reserve 2 -7 (See footnote 13.) (;~ cc 1-j (()Po Nevada Pooled 2 7 (s ee footnote 30 . ) 
1.07 
~p. Ne" Hampshire 8 EmPloyer 2 . 54 2 oa 1 5 6 1-0
7 .q~ Rest~rve 2 7 1-'• Q New Jersey 10 31i Pooled 2 . 7 1. 8 0-9 0 9 o.g 0 . 9 ::s <D p, ~•ew Mexico 10 22 33 Pooled 2 -7 1 . 8 0 9 0.9 0 -9 o.g Lc:' 
3 -036 . HJ tlew York. Pooled (Merit system to be stUdied) 1-j North carollua Pooled 2 -7 (Merit system to be Studied) >::J o ~ North Dakota 8 22 Pooled 2 .7 2 0 1.0 1 .0 1.0 1.0 .q Ot1i0 40 Pooled 5 4 2 .oa 1.56 1.07 1.07 1-· 1-j 3.0 2. ::S"d OklahOllll 10 33 Pooled 2 7 1. 8 0-9 0-9 Q. 9 0.9 Oregon 26 37 :> 99~ E.R !% Pooled 2 . 7 2. 0 l.O 0-5 0 -5 0 .5 ~ (;1 PemlSylvania Pooled 2.7 (No provision !or mer1t system) -. P O Rhode Island Pooled 2 . 7 (Merit system to be studied) ::s I PJ south carolina 10 33 Pooled 2 . 7 1. 8 0.9 :> . 9 0.9 0.9 -J s outh Dakota 23 311 5/6 E . R 1/6 Pooled 2;7 2. 0 1 -0 zero zero zero ,. Tennessee 22 33 Pooled 2.7 I 8 Q.9 0-9 0.9 0-9 Texas 33 Pooled 2 7 1 -8 0 . 9 0 . 9 Q.g 0 .9 llltah Pooled 2 . 7 1.8 0-9 zero zero zero Vermont Choice E.R . or Pooled 2 7 (See ootnote 15) Virginia Pool eel 2 7 (Merit system to be stUdied) washington Pooled 2 -7 (see foo tnote 16. ) west VirgilE. 17 22 33 Po olea 2 .7 Le 1 0 9 0 -9 o.g 0 -9 Wisconsin 18 31 t mployer Reserve 2 7 l . Q zero zero zero zero wyoming 22 33 Pooled 2-7 ?..') 1.0 1.0 1 .0 1.0 Alaska 20 Pooled 2 -7 (Rates _to be set by Commission) Ha·1:a11 Pooled 2 -7 (Merit system to be studied) 
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mE JIERIT UTIIG 
a.a.zoala In all caaea ot pool.M t\mda each eapl()J'er ~~~at have ha4 
~e oalina&r y.ra benetit experienoe to quality tor a •r1t rating. 
1 Batioa betiiMD '11 ~roent-12 peroen,t. (B&l&noe in the eaployer'a 
account to axmual ptVroll.) 
2 Ratio• bet.en 1% peroent--17 peroent. (Balauoe in the employer•• 
account to annual ~oll. 
3 Ratio& over 1'1 percent. (B&lam» in the employer's acoount to 
aDJll.Mil pe;yroll.) 
' Ratloa betaiem 8 pe~lO pel'OCt. {Dal&noe 1n the employer'• 
aooount to anuual ~11.) 
S Ratioa betaen 10 percent-1'2 percent. (Balance 1n the employer' a 
aooount to annual p&li'Ollo 
6 Ratioe betwen l2 percen~l5 peroet. (B&lanoe in the employer' a 
aooount to annual ~-roll. 
1 Bat1oa cmtr 15 peroent. (Balance in the em.plo,yer'• account to 
annual payroll. ) 
8 Do 811Pl07er'a n.te •ball be leaa tlw.n 2 7/10 percent 'Wileaa the 
total aaaeta in the state tuncl e:meed total benetita paid during the pre-
oeding y-.r. or leaa tban 2 pel"'Clt unleia total uaeta 1n the State 
1\md are twioe the bene.tita paid during the priiC*ling oalendar year. 
9 Bo .-plo70r'• ra.te aball be 1 ... ~ 9/10 percent unleaa the to-
tal uaeta 1n the State tund e20H4 total bene.tita paid during the pre-
ceding calendar 7M1". 
10 o employer'• rate shall bo le•• tan 2 7/10 paroct unle•• the 
total aaaeta in the St&te Fund at tbe eD4 ot tM· year exoeed the total 
beneti ta .-14 durin& the pr:eoeding year- or lea• than 'l 8/10 pero.ut un-
leaa the total u1ew in thlt- Sta.~ tund at the end ot the year are at 
least twioe the total benefita !*id dur.ing the preoeding calendar ~· 
ll If the 'beaetit. oharpcl to a.:a;y employer'• aooCNDt tor all put 
montha. or tor the ~t 60 aontha. whiobenr 1a ore be:l»ticial to ~ .a-
pl~. emeeda oontributiona oncHtM to hia aooount, h1a contribution 
rate ahall be f percent. 
1l It th• employer• • oontribut1ona exoeed three t1.ea the benet1 ta 
charged to · hia aooount during the preceding year. h1a oontrlbution lor 
the tollowing calendar year ahall ~ 9/10 percent. · 
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13 Contributiaaa ~or all paat yeara sat eXOHd the total beneti ta 
paid by at loaat tive Uaea the MDunt of 'benetlta paid in aJl1' ot the . 
preoed1ng tllnle y•ra· fhe ea.taaion aball eet the raw for eaoh ..-
ployer at the be.giDD.ing o£ •oh oalenclar -:~ear ao aa to .C• t he balanae 
in the emploY*r'a aoaount 7:Q percent. or hia annual pqrOll. 
lt Ito aployer•a rate ahall be 1 ... t.ba.n 2 7/10 peroent unleaa the 
be.lanoe in the State tund eXOM<I& the total benet1ta paid during the pre-
ceding calendar~· 
15 Ccmtr11Ntiona UDder the merit ayat.m u:uat be an amount autfioient , 
u aet by tNI Ccaniaaion. to :maintain eaoh emplo.rer's reael"'ft at Ta pe:z-
oent of tho put ~~a ~roll and ft•e tt.a the v-teat IUIIP\Jnt of 
beDBf'ita pilid d JJrillb the higtleat ot· the lut thnte yeara. In no ·au• 
aball tlw rate exceed 2 1/10 peroent. 
18 The ec.n8a1on is to aet rate. for each empl07er aubjeot to the fol -
lowing oondi tiona, (1) ~ average rate tor all •ployara in t ho Stat. 
ahall be 2 1/10 percent ot tbs total pa.,yrolle within tlle State tor the · 
praoeding oalendllr ,..,-. and (2) no emploJer'a r.t• ehall be leas than 
9/10 percent. 
lT The total aeaeta in the State 1\md Eat e:ADHd the btlnetita paid. 
durin the prniou. calendar ,.ar before the m.orit tyatem can be •tteoUve, 
and no rate ahall be leas than 1 S/ 10 percent Wlleaa the total aaaeta are 
equal to tldoe the ben tita pe.id cluring the preoed1ng oalend r TOJI.r · 
18 It the eaplo)'el' baa a reurve ratio ot lees than 1 percent &D4 
hia oontributio haft .ezoeede4 benefita obl.rged apill8t hla re .. ne, h1a 
rate tor the- aalendar year aball be 2 7/10 peroent. · 
It the employer' a reserve aooount is· o~rclrac~ or if the bene-
f its Gbarged apdnat hia reaern aooount tor the preoeding oale.udar year 
have eaee4e4 hia oontributiona, hia raw ahall be inoreaaed by percent 
over h1a previous calendar year'a rate .. but in no caae shall hia rate ex-
oeed 4 peroent • 
. ~ ~ •plo;ver• a reaene exceeds ti Ye times the grea teat amount 
ot benet1 ta charged against hi a reaene account during any year wit -.in 
the put threo calendar- )"Ura., but ia leaa than 10 percent of h1a previous 
yoo.r'"s payroll. hie rate ahtJ.l be-. 1 peroct. 
an emplO)"el"'a reaeno exoeeda fiye tiaoa ·the srea~at •"'I'.Ult 
of be.l'letita oba:rpcl againat hia ~ aooount 4\U'inz c.y year within t he 
put three Galendar yean, and ia .1n exoaa o£ 10 pero.nt ot hia prnioua 
caJ.@dU" · yea,r' a ~11 ~ hia rat. ahall be aero .. 
19 .A1'ter lSU., tho COJII!'d.aaion ahall aet rate• eaoh year tor each em-
ployer. The ·&.Wl'&p rate tort~ year tor all aploye:ra wit.lrl.n the State 
aha.ll be ! percent of the ~olle within 1he State, and no employer'• 
raw aball be lua tbao. lt peraent or moro than 4 percent. Faployara -.y 
be olaaaitled by induetriea after public hearinga . 
•109-
.20 ssmlar ·to •19• &bow ,. •xoept th&t the ainiwm. rate 1• so-t at 1 
percent and no ...s-. 1a atated. and uerage ~t• is- set at 2 7/10· per-
cent .. 
21 . It arq -.ployer' a :re....,.-~- 1nautnc1ent to pq the ~ 
tita ohar,pable ap!lult it, hla rate ahall be S 7/10 peroent. 
22 The eaploy•r•·a aoaount aball be orecl1tod with all oontr1but1ona 
-.<le on hie ~lt 1n •me•• of' 1 peroent of hta paat year'•· payroll. 
U 1'he eaployer'• N-MI'W aOOOQilt •hall be ondi.a with 5/6tha ot 
all oontrlbutiona M4e on his 'behalt. 
K the employer•• r•aen• aooount ahall be oredlted with 6/6tba of 
all oontributiou made by' h1m on hia ~ plu S/6tha ot the oontrlbu-
t10J18 -.de 'b7 hie aployeea. 
25 the tn~Plorer'a re•ne &OOOW:lt aball be o:N41ted with 80 percent 
ot all ,oontributlona uac:le on hS..- Mhal.f' • 
.26 the cployor•• naerre. aocQWl.t aball be credited with 99~ percent 
ot all c.ontributi.on~~ made on hia bebalr. 
21 Ra tea in call tornbu 
Below 6 peroent r&tlo r ... rn baleDD8 to avera&• ~-
J"oll t,or paat three ~ the contribution rate .lhall be % 1/10 percent 
For l'lltloa 1n e,xoea.a ol 8 pe:roen:t. but 1.._. than 10 
per.aent ..... . ... . .............. •· •••••• ·-•· ........ ·• .... .. ... .. . ·• • -
For ratioa ot 10 peroent but leas than 12 pel"'OOlt !l.. 
For rati<* of 12 peroct but. le•a than 16 pel,"C«lt .&.JI 
For rat1oa of 15 percent or gt'eat.r............... . 1 
28 Bates in lentuok;rt 
percent 
pe~t 
pereent 
peZ'C*lt 
Below 10 pe.ro4lll t ratio reserve 'b&lm• t.o hi a payroll · 
tor 'the pre':fioue _year .. . ... . ... ............ . .. ·• .. • • • • .. • • • • • • 2. 1 fto peroent. 
Greater tb&n 10 ~roent b1.1t leas than .15 ptJro.nt. • 1 8/10 percent 
<Jrrrea,i;er "tbe.:n. 15' J)«tr..oent ••• • ............ . . 4.. ... . • • . . • Ze.ro 
'to q-uality tor a •rlt rating. the balano. in tbe elllployer' a aooount 
DIU.St be .ti ._ t1~• the greatest G()unt o£ . b4fnef1ta oru.rged. &ga1 nat hia ao-
oount during any calendar year within the I*Jt three -c&lend&r yara. 
29 'fha Coamiaeion 18 to eatabllah contribution rawa tor each ..,... 
pl~r eaoh. y-ear. 'the a'f8rage tor tl:e entire State ah&ll be approxilately 
2 'i /10 peroent and no emplo)'*r shall haw a rate l•as than l percent or 
in exoeaa or Z 6/10 peroent.. . 
30 'rhe Ccmmiaeion le to ea.tabliah contribution rates tar each _... 
ployer eaoh year. The average rate for t ho entire State ~11 be approxi-
mately 2. 7/10 pel"Cent, and no employer shall have a rate les.a than 1 per-
·oent (no max'JIIDD'l ie aet).. , 
-11Q-
Sl Guaranteed aplo,.nt plans are authorised. 
~2. BlllplOJen ~ .. 1iabliah priftte 1naurauae plana with 114ftlltage• 
to tbe nployeea at 1eut u . good u tho• prodded under the Stat• plan. 
~ It &n7 .-player"• benetit p&11118nte charged agaiut hie a CIOOWlt 
nceed the oontrlbutioiU~ credited to hi« aooount tor the put 60 ZDDDtha. 
·or for all put month8~ whichever 1a to the ~lo.yer'a &re&teet adw1Lntap, 
h1a ·oontrlbution :rate aball be 3 6/ 10 ~J'Oent. 
M !be Caaminion shall •ot ratea tor eaoh ewpl~r •oh YMI"•· Th• 
ayerage rate to-r the entire Dlatrict •hall not be 1••• tbm a peromt ot 
tM eatbatecl ~lla tor the Diatriot tar the toll owing year, and no 
ClplO)'er 'a rate aball be 1•• than l'~ per.oent -nor IliON than 4 peroent. 
~- u tlw total benefits char~ aounat any employer•• aooount tor 
~t 120 mantba, or tor all past months , llhiohever 11 Jll08t advanta-
gooua to the -.ployer. ~ed t he total o011t:rlbutiona oredlted to hia ac-
count tor the ._. period, the contribut.1. on rate aball be S 1/10 percent. 
sa u the. total oontribut1ona paid by an 8111Ployer within • calendar 
year exoeed 2 7/10 peroen.t with reapeot to oowreci aplo,...,nt llithin tlw 
-- calendar )"'&r Within th.e staw, the eaployer ahal.l 'be entitled to 
noe.iw a re1\md traa the State- for t hD amount o-f such exoeaa. 
11 It the balance 1n any ~loyer'• reaene aocount at the e!1Al ot 
any calendar year be _1••• tba.n 2~· percent of hia .annual payroll tor the 
preoeding cal!llldar ywar, th8 cClb.tribution rate tor the aucceec11Dg calen-
dar yeer shall be • peroent. 
sa It tbe balance 1n ~ ~lo,.r'• """· acOO\IIit at tM eDd ot 
any .oalemar y•r be leaa than 2j percent ot bia ann...t pqroll tor the 
preoed1ng calendar yea;r·. hie oontr1bu.tion rate tor the auooeecling calen-
dar y•r ahall be 2 T/10 peroat. 
U Bllpl()Jer* a aocCWlt orecl1 ted wl th oon.tributicma in ezoeaa ot 
•/lo peroent or hia payroll. 
'0 It benet1ta oharged during all paat 1Mt'8 emaad oontrlbut1ona 
paid, the ra.te ilhall be ' percent. 
-111-
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